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ABSTRACT 
The production of illicit narcotics in low-intensity conflict environments remains a 
serious concern for U.S. policymakers. Afghanistan is a solid example where the 
intersection of crime, narcotics production and insurgency has successfully thwarted U.S. 
stabilization and security efforts despite a 10-year military engagement there. This study 
seeks to examine the role of crime better, particularly narcotics related criminal 
enterprise, and its effect on the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. This study 
explores political, economic and conflict related factors that facilitate the narcotics 
industry and forges cooperation between drug trafficking organizations and insurgent 
movements. A key argument of this study is that nontraditional participants in narcotics 
production, such as insurgent groups or state representatives and institutions, acquire 
more than just profit and resources. Participants stand to gain political leverage, the social 
and political legitimacy derived from “protecting” the livelihoods of rural farmers, as 
well as “freedom of action;” the ability to operate unimpeded within a given territory or 
space because of public support. This study also suggests that one additional factor, 
social control, is a key motivator for an actor’s participation in the narcotics industry. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
At the crest of the 21st century, Afghan society finds itself in a profound socio-
economic crisis in which the illegal drug trade and insurgency plays a very complex and 
important role. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
the global dynamics of the illicit opiates market “are not well understood,” the same can 
be said of the internal dynamics of Afghanistan’s narcotics industry.1 Despite the 
presence of international forces in Afghanistan since the end of 2001, Afghanistan has 
continued to produce unprecedented amounts of illicit opium, the lead ingredient in 
heroin, making Afghanistan the world’s largest producer of illicit opiates (over 90% of 
the illicit global demand) for the past eight years in a row. All the attention given to 
Afghanistan’s poppy problem, however, obscures the problems caused by another illicit 
crop: cannabis. The first UNODC Afghan Cannabis Survey published in 2010 confirmed 
suspicions that Afghanistan is the now the world’s largest producer of cannabis resin, 
better known as hashish, accounting for approximately 1,500 to 3,500 metric tons of resin 
in 2009 alone.2  
This study seeks to examine the role of crime better, particularly narcotics related 
criminal enterprise, and its effect on the Taliban-led insurgency. Vast amounts of 
evidence reveal how the Taliban, other non-state actors, and state-actors are indeed 
enmeshed with the narcotics industry; a subject this study thoroughly presents and 
examines. However, it should be noted that the Taliban also engage in other criminal 
activities, such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom and robbery to help bolster the 
movement’s war chest.3 Overall, few studies adequately explain how and why the 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report, 2007, 37.  
2 UNODC, Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2009, April 2010. It is pertinent to note that cannabis resin is 
different from the far more common “cannabis weed” of which Mexico, Colombia and the United States 
are top producers. Cannabis weed is grown for its flowers, leaves and stems, which are all harvested and 
processed for consumption while cannabis resin is specifically cultivated and processed for the concentrate 
of tiny trichromes or resin glands found on the cannabis plant’s flowers; although lower grades of hashish 
will incorporate most of the dried organic plant matter along with the resin (leaves, stems, etc.). 
3 UNODC, “Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium,” (October 
2009), 102; Michael J. Carden, “Narcotics Trade Fuels Afghanistan Insurgency, Mullen Says,” American 
Forces Press Service, September 19, 2008. 
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Taliban, a puritanical Islamist movement, came to participate in, and protect the narcotics 
industry, let alone what affect this participation has had, if any, on its group ideology and 
objectives. Additionally, it is pertinent to note that the current literature on the Afghan 
drug trade rarely examines a potential larger issue—the political economy of the “drug-
insurgent nexus” and its penetration of the Afghan state; hence creating the “crime-state 
nexus.”4 By examining the Taliban’s participation and benefit of the drug trade, this 
study also includes the conditional effects on other participants, including drug 
cultivators (i.e., farmers), warlord organizations, criminal syndicates and state 
powers/institutions. This analysis helps answer the main research question of this study: 
why does the Taliban participate in the narcotics industry and how does this affect its 
group ideology and aims? Additionally, what factors or criteria warrant closer 
cooperation points between politically/ideologically motivated armed groups like the 
Taliban and criminal networks, such as drug trafficking groups? 
In short, to best understand why the Taliban participates in the narcotics industry 
and what effect narcotics production and trade has on the Taliban’s objectives and 
ideology, four types of armed polities most consistently altering Afghanistan’s political 
landscape, and those most associated with the drug trade between 1980 and 2010, must be 
identified and analyzed. These four entities can be broken down as insurgent movements, 
warlord organizations, syndicates/consortia, and the state-level power holders (Table 1).5 
As Williams notes, it is these “non-state actors [that] can have more legitimacy among 
the general population than the state, a legitimacy that stems from tradition, cultural 
norms, and informal political processes that work.”6 Arguably, the Taliban movement is 
best understood as a manifestation from the Soviet-Afghan conflict and consists of 
elements from the four types of armed polities examined in this study. By breaking down  
 
                                                 
4 “Crime-State nexus” coined in Svante E. Cornell, “The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: 
From Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration?” China and Eurasia Quarterly, 4, no. 1 (2006) 37–67.  
5 Framework inspired by Jon A. Winat, “Narcotics in the Golden Triangle,” Washington Quarterly, 
Fall 1985.  
6 Phil Williams, “Here Be Dragons,” in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era 
of Softened Sovereignty, ed. Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 43. 
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the unit of analysis to the above-mentioned group of four armed polities, a more holistic 
and richer contextualization of the Taliban movement can be derived rather than treating 
the Taliban movement as a monolithic entity.  
Combined, the drug-insurgent and crime-state nexus represents one of the most 
significant threats to Afghanistan’s sovereignty, and if left unchallenged, the increasing 
merger between criminal organizations with insurgent/terrorist groups could succeed in 
carving out their own semiautonomous territory in southern Afghanistan (Helmand-
Kandahar-Uruzgan provinces), hence making it a “virtual state.”7 The definition of a 
virtual state in this context is similar to Robb’s criterion, which identifies a developed 
economy that thrives on the flow of illicit goods, services, people, resources, and ideas 
made possible by the lack of state control.8 In sum, it is the violence associated with the 
narcotics industry, and the byproduct of this violence―territorial control and defacto 
political control―that seems to drive the motivation for these groups. This criterion is 
what fuels small, private, criminal no state actors that pose the greatest challenge to state 
building initiatives, such as democracy, stability, security and sovereignty.9  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND IMPORTANCE 
The problem of illicit poppy cultivation and narcotics processing in Afghanistan 
has plagued the region for decades, but only recently has the problem soared to 
unprecedented levels. Existing literature contends the mere presence of a drug economy 
alone does not cause the emergence of a terrorist or insurgent group, nor does it correlate 
to the initiation of conflict; however, it does strengthen the capabilities of preexisting 
insurgent forces or other hostile non-state entities.10 This invariably begs the question: 
                                                 
7 Robert J. Bunker, ed., Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (New York: Routledge, 2008), 30–31.  
8 John Robb, “Nation-States, Market-states, and Virtual-states,” in Criminal-States and Criminal-
Soldiers, ed. Robert J. Bunker (New York: Routledge, 2008), 30–31.  
9 Max G. Manwaring, “A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The 
Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies,” Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009, 13.  
10 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” in The Making of a 
Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, vol. III, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006), 174; Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and 
Implications,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 207–227.  
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why does the Taliban participate in the narcotics industry and how does this affect its 
group ideology and aims? What factors or criteria warrant closer cooperation points 
between politically/ideologically motivated armed groups like the Taliban and criminal 
networks, such as drug trafficking groups? These questions in turn represent the explicit 
research questions of this thesis.  
A key argument of this study is that nontraditional participants in narcotics 
production, such as insurgent groups or state representatives and institutions, acquire 
more than just profit and resources. Participants stand to gain political leverage, what 
Brown defines as “political capital,” the social and political legitimacy derived from 
“protecting” the livelihoods of rural farmers, as well as “freedom of action;” the ability to 
operate unimpeded within a given territory or space because of public support.11 This 
study also suggests that one additional factor, social control, is a key motivator for an 
actor’s participation in the narcotics industry. The strong patron-client relationships 
established through the Soviet-Afghan war and subsequent socio-economic and political 
crisis during the civil war (1992–2001) amplified this factor as powerful militia 
commanders, warlords, and criminal syndicate bosses consolidated their grip over 
farmers, processors and trafficking groups in often contested territories. Importantly, no 
single group ever controlled or monopolized the narcotics industry, preventing a vertical 
integration model similar to the cartels established in South America and to a lesser 
degree in Mexico. Instead, a series of transaction networks, or brokerages, emerged, 
creating a criminal-business phenomenon that transcended ethnic, tribal, political, and 
religious lines. These micro-organizations operate within small spheres of influence, in 
fiercely defended territories, but whose products are easily trafficked, protected and sold 
to various stakeholders and powerbrokers, many of whom are often sworn enemies or 
ethnic, tribal, political and business rivals.  
The production of illicit narcotics in low-intensity conflict environments remains 
a serious concern for U.S. policymakers, whether it is in South America where nearly all 
of the world’s illicit supply of cocaine originates; in Mexico, which not only shares a 
                                                 
11 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: 
Brooking Institute Press: 2009).  
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strategic frontier with America but also serves as the main conduit of illicit drugs entering 
the United States; or Southwest Asia where American and NATO forces are entering 
their tenth-year of intervention in Afghanistan—the world’s largest producer of opium 
and hashish.  
The murky intersection of crime, narcotics production and insurgency is a 
difficult problem-set altogether, plaguing policymakers with complicated and often 
counterproductive strategies from which to choose. For example, forced eradication 
measures, a key pillar of the U.S. law enforcement counternarcotics strategy, directly 
contradicts U.S. military counterinsurgency strategies that aim to win the hearts and 
minds of locals. The forced eradication operations in Afghanistan, conducted and 
financed by the U.S. State Department between 2004 and 2009, destroyed local 
economies and pushed many farmers into the hands of the Taliban that offered to protect 
the farmers and their crops against government eradication efforts. In turn, the Taliban 
reaped the whirlwind of the program’s failure and created numerous safe havens and 
sanctuaries throughout the “poppy-belt” of southern Afghanistan while making exuberant 
sums from charging protection fees to traffickers, processors and farmers. Much attention 
has been placed on Afghanistan’s drug-insurgent nexus beginning in 2009. Although a 
step in the right direction, these analyses are narrowly focused and rarely include a 
possible more dangerous relationship altogether—the narcotics penetration of the state 
and Afghanistan’s transformation into a criminal-state. This study is important because it 
can help inform policy makers on broader narco-insurgent conflicts that plague the 
international system. Equally, it brings attention to an important issue that would 
otherwise be avoided for political and organizational reasons. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
Why does the Taliban participate in the narcotics industry and how does this 
participation affect its group ideology and aims? A key hypothesis this study tests is the 
assertion that if an armed political or ideological group participates in the narcotics 
industry, its group ideology and aims will change. This logic refines an inaccurate and 
oversimplified theory common among policy makers that if guerillas rely so heavily on 
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the drug trade, eliminating it will reduce their military and financial capabilities to the 
point of making them vulnerable to defeat or encourage them to negotiate a political 
settlement to the current conflict.12 In other words, “the end of drugs would mean the end 
of the armed conflict, and the end of the conflict would bring the end to the drug 
business.”13  
Clearly, it becomes pertinent to indentify whether or not armed polities 
participating in the drug industry are indeed drug cartels, or whether key differences exist 
between them (i.e., insurgent movements, versus criminal consortium, etc.). In the case of 
revolutionary or insurgent movements, measuring how and when group aims and 
objectives change in accordance with increased levels of narcotics participation becomes 
imperative.  
Conventional wisdom suggests criminal organizations are purely driven by 
economic gains while insurgent/rebellion groups seek to govern, making each polity 
discreetly different. This study seeks to test this position, arguing that while insurgent 
groups may be motivated by political, religious and/or ideological factors, these groups 
can also be motivated by the same factors as criminal groups, such as monetary gain and 
prestige; a convergence of factors that leads to the protraction of conflict especially in 
conflict zones where an illicit drug industry is rampant.14 To do so, the phrase 
“participating in the narcotics industry” must be broken down and well defined to help 
establish a tipping point that will help indentify changes in group ideology and how 
observers will know it. A three-tier framework identifying key aspects of interaction with 
narcotics will be used to measure how armed political groups, such as the Taliban, 
participate in the narcotics trade, and how varying levels of interaction affect group 
cohesion and ideology (Figure 1). 
                                                 
12 This school of thought is also prevalent among decision makers involved in other drug producing 
conflict zones, such as Colombia.  
13 “War on Drugs in Colombia,” Latin America Report no. 11, International Crisis Group, January 27, 
2005, 5. 
14 Jeni, “The Enduring Dichotomy: Insurgent or Criminal,” Crime-Conflict Nexus, May 2, 2009; 
Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2002), 4.  
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Figure 1.   Three Tier Framework Depicting Degrees of Armed Polities’ Participation 
in the Narcotics Industry 
This framework assumes the more involved an armed polity becomes with the 
narcotics industry, the more important monetary gain, financial sustainability, and 
territorial and business control becomes for the group. One reason for this assumption is 
that by the time tier-three participation occurs, the amount of resources and logistics 
dedicated to maintaining this level of narcotics involvement leads to a higher reliance and 
interest in profiteering rather than ideological objectives. Secondly, over time and given 
certain political and military outcomes, armed polities may become increasingly involved 
in the drug trade (tier one to tier two and three) but rarely will a group move backwards 
from tier three participation to a tier one level of acceptance and taxation. Third, once an 
armed polity establishes international distribution interests and relationships with 
transnational criminal organizations, their political legitimacy is not only threatened, but 
group cohesion, ideology, and political objectives become secondary to profiteering and 
self-interests. Therefore, given these parameters, it can be concluded that tier-three 




ideological aims change. Tier-three level participation results in the fragmentation of an 
armed group, leading to unpredictability in its behavior, which complicates the efforts of 
government forces to indentify and counter its actions properly.  
C.  METHODOLOGY 
Taking inspiration from Steinitz, Ehrenfeld, and the more contemporary works of 
Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, this study explores political, economic and 
conflict related factors that inhibit the narcotics industry and the cooperation between 
drug trafficking organizations and insurgent movements, as well as the effect such a 
relationship can have on political outcomes during conflict and the vulnerable post-
conflict period. This study aims to contextualize the political economy of the narcotics 
industry and examines the relationship between the narcotics industry and the insurgency 
but also researches the effect the narcotics industry has had on the state and the 
subsequent erosion of Afghanistan’s sovereignty.  
A better understanding of the causes and consequences of narcotics production 
and its effect on intra-state conflict in Afghanistan (1978–2001) and on the inter-state 
conflict (2001–2010) is critical when attempting to understand fully the influence 
narcotics plays on the motivations of armed political groups currently fighting against the 
state in Afghanistan. A historical analysis that examines the development of 
Afghanistan’s narcotics trade while defining its political economy and analyzing the drug 
trade’s infrastructure best explains the effects narcotics has had on both the insurgency 
and the development of the state since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2002. By using a 
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historical analysis framework, the causes and consequences of Afghanistan’s narcotics 
production, conflict initiation and conflict duration can best be understood.15  
Although other researchers have attempted and occasionally succeeded in 
clandestine field research regarding the narcotics industry, this study relies upon 
internationally recognized institutions and their publications, such as the United Nations 
Office of Crime and Drugs (UNDOC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
Interpol, and documents published by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. State 
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the U.S. 
Treasury Department, the National Drug Intelligence Center, and other official bodies, as 
well as international and regional media reports.16 Although this study depends upon the 
United Nations Drug and Crime Office’s annual drug reports, surveys and bulletins for 
the quantitative analysis of drug cultivation levels, smuggling information and drug 
production levels, the data is not without fault and limitations. Additionally, this study 
does not take on the rigorous quantitative analysis mapping peculiarities between grow 
seasons but identifies sharp increases and decreases in production in conjunction with 
Afghanistan’s intrastate conflict and subsequent social and economic crises, the global 
drug trade, and other external and internal factors to help contextualize the dramatic rise 
in drug production in Afghanistan between 1979 and 2010. The importance of this study 
                                                 
15 As Edmundo Morales notes, the difficulty with the ethics of covert research is the truthfulness of the 
data, communicating research plans to the subjects being studied, the confidentiality of the subjects being 
studied, and the security of the researchers as they enter the field. This framework refers specifically to the 
challenges of field research conducted regarding the narcotics industry. Such resistance to the field worker 
can threaten not only the project itself but also the life of the researcher, making it difficult to obtain 
factually and timely information on critical aspects of the drug trade; its social organization, economic and 
logistical characteristics and its various functionalities. Although limited fieldwork conducted in 
Afghanistan on the narcotics industry has been conducted during the research for this thesis, no field notes, 
interviews, photographs or information from that juncture will be used for the completion of this study. The 
author is also fully aware of the limitations and built in inaccuracies with the methodologies used by early 
field surveys that sought to measure the levels of cultivation, potential outputs, and locations of these 
plantations. However, for consistency purposes, UNODC statistics will be used as a general base line for 
the bulk of this report.  
16 For a body of successful accounts of outside observers infiltrating the drug industry see Ko-Li Chin, 
The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia’s Drug Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); 
Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2009; David MacDonald, Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws and Scorpion Tales (London: Pluto 
Press, 2007); Hideyuki Takano, The Shore Beyond Good and Evil: A Report from Inside Burma’s Opium 
Kingdom (Reno, NV: Kotan Publishing, 2002); Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru 
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989).  
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remains the relationships between criminal syndicates and armed political groups by 
examining the political economy of armed polities; the dimension most commonly 
associated with power brokers in the narcotics industry. Evaluating the political economy 
of such groups requires an examination of the political, economic, and military assets 
each groups acquires and loses during periods of civil war; or “system of war.”17  
The political dimension of this framework identifies and examines Afghanistan’s political 
environment over the course of four distinct periods of political and military upheaval 
and narcotics production. These include 1979–1992, or the Cold War conflict period, 
1994–2001, the Taliban era, and 2001–2010, the post-Taliban period. Since 1980, armed 
political groups have emerged and flourished, withered and died, and manifested so many 
times that it becomes more useful to identify and define the types of armed polities rather 
than specific groups and organizations. This framework goes beyond generically lumping 
together armed political groups into such as monolithic identities like “belligerents” or 
“the forces of narco-jihad” as other crime-rebellion studies have done.18 Instead, the four 
types of armed polities most consistently altering Afghanistan’s political landscape and 
those most associated with the drug trade between 1980 and 2010 can be broken down as 
insurgent movements, warlord organizations, syndicates/consortia, and the state-level 
power holders (Table 1).19 The Taliban movement is best understood as a manifestation 
from the Soviet-Afghan conflict and a compilation from the four types of armed polities 
examined in this study. As stated before, breaking down the unit of analysis to these four 
armed polities, a more holistic and richer contextualization of the Taliban movement can 
be derived rather than treating the Taliban movement as a monolithic entity. 
 
                                                 
17 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 5. 
18 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs; Eshan Ahrari, Vanda 
Felbab-Brown, and Louise I. Shelley with Nazia Hussain, “Narco-Jihad: Drug-trafficking and Security in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #20 (December 
2009).  
19 Framework inspired by Winat, “Narcotics in the Golden Triangle.”  
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Table 1.   Definitions and Examples of Armed Polities in Afghanistan 
 
                                                 
20 Haji Aman/Haji Amin Kheri. 
21 Although just the Afridi mafia is merely a term to describe the consortium of heroin traffickers in 
the Landi Kotal area, key traffickers from the area included Sheikh Jumor, Mustaq Malik, Zulfakir 
Choudry, and Ayoub Afridi. See Brian Freemantle, The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade (New York: 
TOR Books/Tom Doherty Associates, 1987), 171–179.  
Insurgent Movements Warlord 
Organizations 
Syndicates/Consortia State-Level Power 
Holder 
―These groups are 
distinguished by their 
primary goals, such as 
interrelated ideology 
rather than distinct 
religious or ethnic 
composition.  
―Their principal 
purpose is to 
overthrow the central 
government and 
replace it with their 
own political 
organization rather 
than separating from 
the government.  
―These groups 
include the mujahideen 
resistance factions that 
fought the Afghan 
government and Soviet 





Afghan society and 
the resources 
available to those in 
leadership roles 
within the resistance.  










that extended the civil 
war period after the 




the bulk of drug 
processing 
entrepreneurs, 
engage in poppy 
trading and money 
lending to poppy 
farmers, provide 
access to precursor 
chemicals and pay 
protection fees to 
ensure the safety of 
drug convoys.  
―These consortia 
are typically based 
along, family, 
communal, tribal 
and/or ethnic lines. 
 
― The government 
has historically 




―This pretense has 
created a legacy of 
“old hands” 
concerning the drug 
industry, creating a 




rose to prominence 
during the war. 
―The duration of 
conflict and erosion 
of Afghanistan’s 
economic base has 






Islami, , Ittehad-i 
Islami, Hezb-e-
Whadat, Shura-ye 
Nazar, the Islamic 
Movement of 
Uzbekistan, Taliban.  
Examples: 
Esmatullah Muslim, 
Haji Zaman, Hazrat 












Abdul Qadir and the 
Arsalayee clan, the 
Khogyani 
consortium20 the 
“Afridi mafia” (in 
Landi Khotal)21, Haji 
Baaz Mohammad, 
Haji Bashir Noorzai, 
Haji Juma Khan, Haji 
Bagcho, Azizullah 







Shahin, Ahmed Wali 
Karzai, Mir Wali, 
Aref Noorzai Khan, 
Haji Agha Lalai 
Dastagiri, Abdul 
“Koka” Khan, Haji 
Zahir.  
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By defining and tracking these four polities over the given time period, the 
necessary and sufficient criteria for various types of participation in the narcotics industry 
by armed political groups and government institutions can be drawn out and established. 
To help provide a richer context for these criteria, the economic aspect of this study 
identify three key components of the ubiquitous “narco-economy;” including the conflict 
economy, the informal economy, and the surviving/coping economy, and compare how 
each of the four armed polities interact and stimulate these economic dimensions.22 
Additionally, to help explain when and how armed polities’ ideas and aims change and 
how that is known; four questions are addressed within the historical framework: 
• What conditions influence the scope and size of the illicit narcotics 
industry? 
• How do government reactions to the narcotics industry, i.e., acceptance, 
prohibition, eradication, interdiction, or laissez-faire approaches, affect the 
capabilities of armed polities?  
• How do the four types of armed polities engage in the narcotics industry? 
• What benefits do the armed polities reap from participating in the 
narcotics trade? 
Answering these questions within the above mentioned historical analysis helps 
test the robustness of the hypotheses listed earlier, particularly that fighting drug 
production and drug trafficking is both a necessary and sufficient condition for moving 
Afghanistan toward a lasting peace. Simply put, the more enmeshed an armed guerilla 
group becomes in illicit or criminal activity; the less likely it is to abandon its illicit 
source of revenue. This factor alone promotes the importance in better understanding the 
role narcotics plays in a conflict and its effect on political outcomes including a post-
conflict environment.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This study examines the conditions that create the drug-insurgent nexus to 
flourish in Afghanistan and track the changes in the threat posed by the narcotics industry 
                                                 
22 This framework is based on Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in 
Afghanistan,” Journal of Agrarian Change 5, no. 2 (April 2005): 191–216. 
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in Afghanistan through four different periods of political upheaval and conflict; 
beginning in 1979 and ending with the current conflict. To frame the complexities 
involved with this historical case study properly, Afghanistan’s intra-state conflict and 
international influences must be examined against its ideological and economic 
dimensions within a broader sociological and historical framework. 
Chapter II examines the theoretical concepts associated with the narcotics-
insurgency nexus by reviewing the relevant literature. Chapter III identifies the causes 
and consequences of intra-state conflict and the on-set of narcotics production on an 
industrial scale between 1980 and 1992, referred to here within as the Cold-War conflict 
era. Several main themes, namely major structural shifts in the global heroin industry and 
the effects of Soviet war doctrine, such as the intentional targeting of Afghanistan’s 
agricultural infrastructure are carefully examined and explained. Similarly, the 
militarization of Afghan society as a byproduct from the conflict reflects how non-
traditional community leaders, such as the village mullah and the military commander, 
became prominent; establishing control over the countryside, militarized traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the jirga system, both of which propelled the role 
of narcotics as a main feature in the conflict economy.  
The dark period of Afghanistan’s contemporary history, the chaos following the 
state’s collapse in 1992 and the subsequent civil war that engulfed Afghanistan until 
2001, are examined in Chapter IV. The effect of spoils politics, environmental and social 
factors, such as drought and the return of refugees, created a surge in Afghanistan’s 
opium output during this period. The rise of the Taliban in 1994 and its domination of the 
state following its capture of Kabul in 1996 led to paradox in contemporary political 
science; the rise of puritanical Islamist movement that facilitated and funded itself largely 
from the narcotics industry. This little explored aspect provides the first possible account 
of an “Islamic narco-state,” or as Maley suggests, “narco-fundamentalism.”23  
 
                                                 
23 William Maley, “Interpreting the Taliban,” in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the 
Taliban, ed. William Maley (NY: New York University Press, 1998), 2–3. 
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Chapter V explores the post-2001 conflict period and its multi-polar dimensions 
of state building, international presence, and a resurgent insurgency overlaid with an 
entrenched and burgeoning narcotics industry. The proliferation of the Afghan opium 
trade has become a crucial factor in the political and economic power structures in 
Southwest Asia. A further understanding of the various relationships between insurgent 
groups, narcotics traffickers and some criminal personalities within the Afghan polity are 
examined using large amounts of empirical and judicial evidence. A summary analysis of 
this study’s findings and potential watch-points for drug-insurgent and crime-state nexus 
evolution are presented in Chapter VI.  
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II.  THEORIZING THE NARCOTICS-INSURGENCY NEXUS  
Generally, four fields of research tend to describe the connection between 
insurgent and criminal groups via the illicit narco-economies in which they participate: 
the narco-terrorism phenomenon, the crime-rebellion nexus (or convergence theory), “in-
house capabilities theory,” and divergence theory. This literature review summarizes 
these areas of research and how they provide a foundation to the thesis argument.  
A. BACKGROUND ON “NARCO-TERRORISM” AND THE “DRUG-
INSURGENT NEXUS” 
The problem of “narco-terrorism” and the “drug-insurgent nexus” first became 
apparent in the early 1980s and it is often associated with the drug-fueled insurgencies in 
Peru and Colombia.24 Lupsha’s early and simple definition of narco-terrorism, the 
unlawful use of violence by drug-traffickers, remains apt; although, the use of drug 
trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and rebellion groups as 
defined by Ehrenfeld is more practical when understanding the crime-state nexus found 
in Afghanistan.25  
However, the DEA’s definition of narco-terrorism provides the best overall 
description and most closely resembles Afghanistan’s drug-insurgent nexus. In 2002, 
DEA director Asa Hutchinson defined narco-terrorism as “the participation of groups or 
associated individuals in taxing, providing security, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug 
trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities terrorist groups, or 
associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, 
                                                 
24 David B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin America Drug Trade (New York: Praeger, 
1988); David B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States 
and Panama (New York: Praeger, 1989). In 1983, then Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry 
coined the term “narco-terrorism” when he described attacks conducted by Sendero Luminoso (the Shining 
Path) against Peruvian counternarcotics personnel. Thomas Cieslik, “Mexico: Between Skepticism, Hope 
and Disillusion,” in The World Views of the U.S. Presidential Election: 2008, ed. Matthias Maass, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12. 
25 Peter A. Lupsha, “Towards an Etiology of Drug Trafficking and Insurgent Relations: The 
Phenomenon of Narco-terrorism,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 13, 
no. 2 (Fall 1989): 61–75; Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism: How Governments around the World Have 
Used the Drug Trade to Finance and Further Terrorist Activities (New York: Basic Books, 1990), xviii. 
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transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these 
activities.”26 Alarmingly, narco-terrorism has received little attention outside of conflict 
zones in South America, and in some cases, like Afghanistan, narco-terrorism has been 
ignored by many of the international participants operating in Afghanistan. This is partly 
because the collection and analysis on criminal intelligence is not the sole priority of 
military intelligence agencies or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but falls under 
the jurisdiction of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is rarely 
responsible for weighing its political implications. As Ehrenfeld notes, the difficulty in 
recognizing a problem as complex and multifaceted as narcotics production without 
having a ready solution, is “a quandary that policy makers are all too happy to avoid.”27 
The history of narco-terrorism is well documented, spanning nearly 30 years and 
encompasses a wide spectrum of ideological and political insurgent groups and their 
cooperation with narcotics-trafficking groups. In 1983, a relatively early juncture in the 
Soviet-Afghan war, a spokesman for the DEA ominously warned, “that the mujahidin 
were financing their struggle against the Soviets at least in part through the sale of 
opium.”28 On March 10, 1984, a joint Colombian military and DEA raid against 
Tranquilandia, a “cocaine super-lab” owned by the infamous drug baron Pabolo Escobar 
and located deep in territory (Yari plains) controlled by leftists guerrillas known as the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombia (FARC), exposed deep ties between narco-
traffickers and leftist guerillas and terrorists, namely FARC and the M-19 movement 
(Movimiento 19 Abril).29 Similar drug-insurgencies have occurred the world over, 
affecting secular and Islamist movements alike. Hezbollah, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and smaller 
Druze and Christian militias became deeply entangled with the narcotics industry during 
                                                 
26 Statement of Asa Hutchinson Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, March 13, 
2002.  
27 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, xv. 
28 Mark S. Steinitz, “Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 1985.  
29 James Adams, The Financing of Terror: How the Groups That are Terrorizing the World Get the 
Money to Do It (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 215–237; “War on Drugs in Colombia,” 8.  
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Lebanon’s civil war (1975–1991).30 Twenty-eight years after its creation, Hezbollah still 
maintains a firm grip on south Lebanon’s narcotics industry, processing and trafficking 
an astounding four to five tons of heroin into Israel in 2008.31 Burma is another well 
documented intra-state conflict where narcotics production and trafficking has provided 
insurgents, paramilitary organizations and ethnic militias with substantial funding to 
support their subversive operations and political legitimacy through the protection of the 
rural peasantry and their livelihoods (opium poppy cultivation and processing).32 
Afghanistan is not dissimilar to these unstable drug-insurgent plagued landscapes. 
Several principal conclusions can be drawn from examining these war-zones with 
Afghanistan’s drug-insurgency nexus, all of which provide significant insight into the 
complex drug-insurgent problem currently facing decision makers. First, criminal and 
drug trafficking organizations are creating strategic partnerships with terrorist and armed 
political groups to boost profits or enhance military capabilities. The role of organized 
crime is a severely misunderstood dimension of the Afghan conflict, and as Williams 
suggests, both criminal enterprise and criminal activities have a profound debilitating 
effect on reconstruction and development ventures, acts as a political and economic 
spoiler, and facilitates armed clashes over territory vital to criminal markets like 
traditional opium grow areas.33  
Second, the more enmeshed an armed guerilla group becomes in illicit or criminal 
activity; the less likely it is to abandon its illicit source of revenue.34 Ehrenfeld correctly 
asserts that if the opportunity arises for insurgent or terrorists groups to engage in  
 
                                                 
30 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism: How Governments around the World Have Used the Drug Trade to 
Finance and Further Terrorist Activities, 52–74. Elizabeth Picard, “Trafficking, Rents and Diaspora in the 
Lebanese War,” in Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Greed and Creed, ed. 
Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2005), 23–51.  
31 Matti Friedman, “On Jumpy Israel-Lebanon Frontier, a Quiet Drug War,” Associated Press, April 
19, 2009.  
32 Ronald D. Renard, The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs & the Making of the Golden Triangle 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).  
33 Phil Williams, “Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq,” Strategic Studies 
Institute (June 2009): 11.  
34 Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” 177. 
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narcotics, they will chose to do so rationally: “if it works and the costs and risks are low, 
why not? If undertaking risk is adventurism, then timidity in the face of opportunity is 
equally to be avoided.”35 
Beginning in the late 1970s, increased insurgent and terrorist connections to illicit 
activity like narcotics production are partially a result of the worldwide expansion in the 
demand in drugs, which has opened up new opportunities for what might be considered 
non-traditional suppliers; including political parties and even some sovereign 
governments.36 Despite conflicting long-term objectives and initial aversion or 
suspicions, insurgent groups and those involved in the narcotics industry share many 
short-term goals of mutual benefit. This can lead to cooperation, especially when the co-
location of insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade occurs over any extended period of 
time. As Steinitz astutely observes, co-location typically occurs in remote regions; 
usually areas well below the poverty line with little or no government control, explaining 
why the narcotics related activity of large rural-based insurgents tend to be most 
systematic and extensive than that of urban-based terrorist-insurgent groups or those 
terror-insurgent groups transient or transnational in character.37 Therefore, “rural 
insurgency and drug production (especially cultivation and processing) both thrive in 
remote and rugged areas where the central government is weak and where a nationally-
integrated economic infrastructure is lacking.”38  
B. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: CRIMINAL AND INSURGENTS, 
DIVERGENT OR ANALOGOUS? 
The growing and dangerous links between terrorist groups and drug traffickers 
has raised much attention since the early 1990s, but little focus has been applied to the 
nexus between drug traffickers and insurgent movements. Scholars have widely debated 
the nature and extent of this connection, offering conflicting views about motivational 
                                                 
35 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism: How Governments around the World Have Used the Drug Trade to 
Finance and Further Terrorist Activities, xvii. 
36 Steinitz, “Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade.”  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
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and strategic drivers. Are criminal organizations and insurgent movements correctly 
viewed as distinct phenomenon, or can operational overlap eventually change the 
motivations that drive resistance movements?  
Conventional wisdom regarding criminal and insurgent cooperation suggests that 
criminals and insurgents/terrorists diverge in both motivations and methods used to 
achieve their objectives. Alison Jamieson forcefully argues that organized crime 
syndicates and terrorism “are correctly viewed as a distinct phenomenon;” implying, “the 
terrorist is a revolutionary, with clear political objectives inviting the overthrow of a 
government or the status quo, and a set of articulated strategies to achieve them.” 39 
Whereas “organized crime actors are inherently conservative: they tend to resist political 
upheaval and seek condition of order and stability, those more conductive to their 
business activities.”40 Naylor offers a similar approach but explicitly compares the 
divergent motivations between criminals and insurgents:  
A world of difference exists between the motives of insurgent versus 
criminal groups. Criminals commit economic crimes to make money. The 
buck, so to speak, stops there. But to an insurgent group, money is merely 
a tool—one that is necessary but not sufficient to achieve the group’s 
goals.41 
Jamieson’s argument, although clearly articulated, fails to recognize the reality of 
the battle space drug traffickers and the violent resistance movements in which they 
operate. First, organized crime and hostile non-state actors tend to flourish in areas 
suffering from both weak governance and political upheaval. As Varese notes, “the more 
confused the legal framework of a country, the more incompetent the police, the more 
inefficient the courts, the more the mafia will thrive.”42 Criminal and insurgent groups 
both stand to benefit from attacking the state and sowing fear among the populace as 
                                                 
39 Jamieson cited in Alex Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of Narco-
Terrorism?” Club de Madrid, January 27, 2005.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Louise Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized 
Crime & International Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005.  
42 Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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chaos and instability creates the environment needed for their survival. Second, as 
Aleksandar Fatić argues, “a distinction based on motivation falls on the grounds of the 
identity of the perpetrators.”43 In conflict, the line between resistance movements and 
criminal syndicates is blurred. Fatić indicates many of the actors engaged in organized 
crime and those engaged in terrorist activities are indeed the same networks and 
individuals.44 He suggests many of the main leaders of the Albanian insurgent movement 
in Kosovo in the late 1990s and early 2000s were people previously known as key heroin 
traffickers belonging to the same syndicate.  
Importantly, criminal and drug trafficking organizations utilize terrorist tactics to 
achieve their short-term goals and objectives, not all of which are economically 
motivated as Jamieson and Naylor profess. Williams and Savona have categorized five 
different reasons criminal organizations deploy terror tactics and anti-state activities to 
achieve certain outcomes: 1) to disrupt investigations; 2) to deter the introduction or 
continuation of vigorous government policies; 3) to eliminate effective law enforcement 
officials; 4) to coerce judges into more lenient sentencing policies; and 5) to create an 
environment more conductive to criminal activity.45  
Similarly, insurgent organizations increasingly rely on organized crime tactics, 
such as smuggling, human/drug/weapons trafficking, document forging, money 
laundering, “taxing” and extortion to facilitate financial gain. Components largely 
excluded from this list but equally as important are bribery and political penetration. 
Drug trafficking groups typically levitate between illicit and licit markets, making most 
of their profit from the illicit production, trafficking and sales of narcotics but reinvesting 
in licit enterprises and government positions. Some analysts argue the narco-penetration 
of state institutions is a far more dangerous outcome than criminal collusion with 
rebellion or terrorist groups. Mills labels this merger an underground empire that 
“maintains its own armies, diplomats, intelligence services, banks, merchant fleets and 
                                                 
43 Aleksandar Fatić, “The Criminal Syndicate as Parastate in the Balkans: Is the ‘New War-Making 
Criminal Entity’ a Reality?” South East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, no. 04 (2004). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona, “Introduction: Problems and Dangers Posed by Organized 
Crime in the Various Regions of the World,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 25. 
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airlines.”46 Some criminologists argue that criminal and insurgent motivations are simply 
too divergent for both parties cooperate even for short-term, mutually beneficial 
transactions. While acknowledging the shared methodology and tactics between criminals 
and insurgents, Dishman insists transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and 
insurgents generally do not cooperate with each other to advance their aims and 
interests.47 Instead, terrorist and insurgent groups prefer to use their own “in-house” 
capabilities to undertake criminal and political acts. Simply put, Dishman’s theory 
assumes insurgents would opt to develop their own capabilities to conduct criminal 
actions, whether it is forging documents, processing and trafficking drugs, or kidnapping 
for ransom, rather than outsourcing these actions to known specialists.  
Undoubtedly, insurgent and criminal organizations may occasionally development 
“in-house” capabilities, such as bomb making and money laundering, but this 
development process often takes more time than is available. Schimd notes, “in the case 
of Colombia, there were reports indicating that cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar hired ELN 
(National Liberation Army) guerrilleros to plant car bombs in 1993.”48 A coalition of 
narco-criminals and insurgents is prolific in Afghanistan and several examples of this 
union have been well documented and observed. For instance, the arrest of Haji Juma 
Khan, a key narco-trafficker from southern Afghanistan in August 2008, displays how 
involved drug traffickers have become in the Afghan insurgency.49 Khan was indicted on 
multiple narco-terrorism charges, including the facilitation of a suicide bomb attack 
against an Afghan governor in 2007 that killed six bodyguards and the deadly suicide 
bombing attack against the Serena Hotel in Kabul that killed eight people, including an 
American citizen.50 On April 30, 2008, a suicide bomber detonated himself at a district 
police headquarters in eastern Afghanistan, killing 11 counter-narcotics policemen and 
                                                 
46 James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Governments Embrace (New York: 
Doubleday, 1986), 3–4.  
47 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, 
(2001): 43–58.  
48 Ibid. 
49 United States District Court, Southern District of New York, unsealed Indictment, United States of 
America v. Hajji Juma Khan. 
50 Ibid.  
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injuring 31 others, including the district administrator.51 The Taliban assumed 
responsibility for the deadly attack and the UN issued a statement shortly afterward 
saying, “the circumstances of this attack illustrate the unmistakable bonds of partnership 
between terrorists and drug traffickers.”52 It would be inaccurate to assume that “in-house 
capabilities” of Afghan drug trafficking organizations affords criminals the opportunity 
the continually deploy suicide bombers against law enforcement and anti-narcotics 
personnel.  
C. CRIME-REBELLION NEXUS AND CRIME-STATE NEXUS 
Numerous scholars in the fields of economics and sociology have argued that the 
key drivers for the production of illegal narcotics are poverty, inequality, economic crises 
and state corruption.53 Additionally, some policymakers have correlated higher levels of 
violence and conflict to an increase in narcotics production. The production of narcotics, 
especially in the few regions of the world that produce abnormally large amounts of 
illegal narcotics, like Colombia, Peru, Afghanistan and Burma, is symptomatic of larger 
socioeconomic and political problems altogether. Undoubtedly, the presence of civil 
unrest, political and economic crises, instability and open warfare create the conditions 
needed for a narcotics industry to thrive. However, what happens when armed groups that 
are fighting against a state are introduced to the illicit market of narcotics production?  
Cornell and Makarenko suggest the more an armed political or ideological group 
become involved in the drug industry, the more likely these groups will morph into a 
more orthodox version of a criminal syndicate despite maintaining divergent ideology 




                                                 
51 “Suicide Attack on Afghan Anti-Drugs Team Kills 18,” Daily Times, April 30, 2008.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 48–52.  
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representing two points on the same continuum, with the biggest differences being 
terrorist groups have more defined political goals and objectives, whereas criminal 
syndicates are driven by economic motives.54 
The foundation of the crime-terror nexus theory, or as Cornell suggests, the 
“crime-rebellion nexus” which incorporates insurgent movements into the model, and 
therefore, more applicable in this study, is viewing the relationship between organized 
crime and insurgent movements on a continuum with various degrees in between 
representing steps toward a convergence (Figure 2).55 Simply put, the more engaged in 
narcotics related activities, the more likely ideological erosion occurs, with profit and 
monetary gain trumping political and ideological objectives. O’Malley and Hutchinson 
have refined this theory by indentifying that a terrorist or insurgent organizations’ 
structure are key predictors of the types of crimes in which they engage, while their 
ideological (i.e., political) distinctiveness from organized crime “preclude fully symbiotic 
cooperation.”56 As stated before, this study aims to apply this assumption to the armed 





Figure 2. Crime-Rebellion Continuum 
  
The crime-terror nexus, and the more contemporary “crime-rebellion nexus,” 
remains a serious threat to nation-states, particularly in the developing world, and among 
the litany of pre and post-Cold War conflict zones suffering from decades of state 
sponsored warfare.57 
                                                 
54 Alan Wright, Organised Crime (Portland, OR: Willan, 2006).  
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Afghanistan remains one such conflict zone, the victim of a raging insurgency and 
weak state institutions plagued by a serious dependence on narcotics production, 
corruption, cronyism, and lacks both state capacity and legitimacy.58 Similar 
circumstances have occurred among a multitude of different insurgent groups in varying 
geographic locales. Recent examples include the Kosovo Liberation Army trafficking in 
heroin to help fund military operations during the liberation of Kosovo, as well as 
guerilla groups in Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Lebanon and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia that also participated in drug trafficking to fund terrorist 
activities.59 Currently, Afghanistan’s insurgency is showing signs of a partial transition 
into criminal syndicates among some of its elements, particularly in the semiautonomous 
drug-producing provinces of southwestern Afghanistan.  
Economic agendas, fused with quasi-political ambitions or local territory 
domination, fueled Afghanistan’s conflict throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Following the 
removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, these underlying economic agendas have 
only complicated the socio-economic and political situation further. Many of the former 
sub-state actors are now key government officials or influential businessmen who 
straddle the line between warlords or crime bosses, formal businessmen, and 
politicians.60 
D. COOPERATION AND CONVERGENCE WATCH POINTS 
Despite literature suggesting the impracticality of criminal and insurgent 
cooperation, numerous criteria points indicate when criminals and insurgents will 
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cooperate especially when mutually beneficial conditions exist. Steinitz recognized over 
20 years ago that “despite conflicting long-term objectives and initial antipathy or 
suspicions, insurgent groups and those involved in the narcotics industry share many 
short-term goals and can be of mutual benefit. This can lead to cooperation especially 
when the co-location of insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade occurs over any 
extended period of time.”61 Additionally, the sharing of geographical space between 
narcotics producers and traders and armed political groups typically occurs in rural, 
remote, and/or rugged regions where weak or nonexistent state influence exists. 
According to Stenitz, this helps explain why the narcotics related activity of large rural-
based insurgents tend to be more systematic and extensive than that of urban-based 
terrorist-insurgent groups or those terror-insurgent groups transient or transnational in 
character.62  
The merger of criminals and insurgents is not purely financial. According to 
Brown, motivations for criminal and insurgent association or cooperation include 
political capital, or in other words, social control and political legitimacy, the 
enhancement of physical capabilities, and freedom of action.63 Schimd goes further, 
suggesting additional motivations, such as the independence from state sponsorship; 
access to specialist skills (money laundering, bomb-making specialists, etc.); facilitation 
of cross-border movements (use of smuggling routes); substituting activity during 
armistices or at end of hostilities; and coming into contact with a wider range of potential 
recruits who are already outlaws.64 Highlighting such circumstances further, the 
Counterterrorism Center (CTC) sponsored workshop entitled, The Evolution of Terrorists 
into Criminals: Drivers and Implications, held in May 2009, identified 12 such drivers, 
factors, or events that determine whether and how a terrorist group evolves towards 
criminality. Similarly, an in-depth study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice in 
                                                 
61 Steinitz, “Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade.” 
62 Ibid. 
63 The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, vol. III, ed. James J. F. Forest, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and 
the War on Drugs.  
64 Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of Narco-Terrorism? 
 26
2005 investigating the shared methods and motives between criminal and terrorist groups 
came to a similar conclusion, identifying twelve “watch-points” or indicators when 
terrorists and criminals will likely cooperate or engage in mutually beneficial actions.65 
The criteria points from each of the four reports have been synthesized into a table that 
includes a “modified” column incorporating those elements most applicable when 
analyzing Afghanistan’s violent non-state actors (Table 2).  
 
CTC Criteria Schmid’s Criteria DOJ “Watch 
Points” 
Modified 
Economic Necessity Access to greater financial 
resources 
Open activities in 
the legitimate 
economy 






Independence from state 
sponsorship 
Shared illicit nodes Political Capital/social 
control 
Social Control Building an economic base, 
compensating for lack of 
public support 







Access to specialist skills (e.g., 
forging of travel documents) 
Use of information 
technology (IT) 
Organizational structures 
Legitimacy of Crime 
as a Strategy 
Facilitation of cross-border 
movements 




Substitute activity during 
armistices or at end of 
hostilities 
Use of corruption Use of corruption 










Access to expertise in illicit 







 Drug traffickers obtain 
protection for illicit drug 
cultivation or trafficking from 
insurgent military skills. 
Organizational 
goals 
Drug traffickers obtain 
protection for illicit drug 
cultivation or trafficking 
from insurgent military 
skills. 
 Insurgent destabilization of 
political and economic 
structures creates favorable 
environments for criminal 
activities 
Culture Geographical setting/co-
location of rebellion 
groups and criminal 
organizations. Typically 
rural, isolated and rugged. 
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CTC Criteria Schmid’s Criteria DOJ “Watch 
Points” 
Modified 
 Law enforcement 
preoccupation with countering 
insurgency diverts attention 
from criminal activities 
Popular 
support/Trust 
To deter the introduction 
or continuation of 
vigorous government 
policies (i.e., drug 
eradication measures) 
 Political-terrorist label 
provides extra degree of 
‘intimidation.’ 
  
Table 2.   Convergence Points and Overlap between Criminal Groups and Insurgents 
The implications of criminal involvement and drug related activities (cultivation, 
processing, trafficking) invariably affect the relationship between armed polities with the 
state and society. Whether or not group cohesion and ideology is impacted directly, no 
doubt exists that these groups benefit by enhancing their military capabilities, such as 
acquiring more advanced weapons and supplies, can afford to employ more fighters, 
corrupt political leaders, access criminal specialists, such as document forgers and money 
laundering networks—all of which results in the further weakening of the state. As 
Cornell notes, the combination of crime and drugs is instrumental in enabling an armed 
polity to threaten the security, stability and sovereignty of a state at its very foundation—
specifically by challenging its monopoly of the use of force and control over territory.66 
The intrinsic relationship between criminals and insurgents has seriously eroded Afghan 
state authority, successfully defeated law enforcement efforts to curb drug production, 
and continues to pose a serious threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan. 
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III.  INTRA-STATE CONFLICT, NARCOTICS PRODUCTION 
AND SOCIAL CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN (1980–1992) 
Heroin is our mineral wealth. 
―Proverb among the Afridi tribesmen in eastern Afghanistan 
In 2007, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that 
Afghanistan produced 8,200 metric tons of opium on 193,000 hectares of arable land 
(Table 3). The 2007 bumper crop is the equivalent to nearly 800 metric tons of heroin, 
more than double the annual demand for illicit refined heroin. Afghanistan’s 
unprecedented level of opium production is not completely unfounded despite the 
desperate search by the international community for programs to bolster its 
counternarcotics efforts in war torn Afghanistan.  
 
 
Table 3.   Amount of Hectares Culitvated with Opium Poppies in Afghansitan 1994–
2010 
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Therefore, how has intra-state conflict in conjunction with narcotics production 
altered political, social and cultural factors in Afghan society? Afghanistan has an ancient 
tradition of opium and cannabis production, but only within the past 40 years has intra-
state conflict, ineffective governance, corruption and the widespread destruction of 
Afghanistan’s licit agriculture sector propelled Afghanistan into the realm of a “narco-
state.”  
To contextualize Afghanistan’s addiction to an entrenched narco-economy 
properly, this chapter incorporates a historical analysis of Afghanistan’s intra-state 
conflict, subsequent political and economic crises, and global factors in the world’s 
supply of illicit narcotics. The Cold War period of conflict (1980–1992) increased illicit 
drug production and according to Goodhand, evolved into a complex overlay of three 
types of competing economies: conflict, coping and survival economies; all of which 
have usurped and transformed traditional aspects of Afghan society.67 Secondly, the rise 
in illicit narcotics production, at least on an industrial scale, is a byproduct of the first 
phase of intra-state conflict (1980–1989), not a causal mechanism for conflict. 
This chapter primarily examines the impact of narcotics production in conjunction 
with Afghanistan’s intrastate conflict during the Cold War era (1980–1992). Not 
surprisingly, the increase of narcotics production coincided with Afghanistan’s political 
and security upheaval following the Soviet invasion on December 24, 1979. However, 
both internal and external factors drastically affected the upward trajectory of narcotics 
production in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Internally, the Soviet’s pacification program 
attempted to “starve” the resistance by attacking the rural agriculture infrastructure, such 
as karez (irrigation canals, or qanāt in Dari), poisoned wells, destroyed harvests and 
Soviet military operations intentionally targeted and killed farmers.68 Following the 
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Soviet invasion, the United States, Europe and all Middle Eastern states ended their 
financial support to Afghanistan, leaving the agricultural sector starving for resources. 
Each of these elements led to the ultimate destruction of Afghanistan’s traditional licit 
agricultural sector. Simultaneously, the war created a conflict economy, dictated by the 
actions of resistance commanders and their clientele, and a coping economy, which rural 
farmers, choosing to stay in their native rural environs, adopted. A third overlapping 
economy dubbed the “shadow” economy for the purpose of this study; benefited those 
actors participating in illicit activities, such as smuggling, drug processing and 
refinement.69 The delineation between conflict economy and shadow economy are “those 
actors whose objective it is to wage war and those who aim to make profit.”70 
Opium, a low risk, high-profit commodity, became the pivotal product of all three 
economies. The established networks of weapons pipelines facilitated by Pakistan’s ISI to 
arm the resistance in Afghanistan became the logical source of illicit drug exportation 
back into Pakistan. By examining internal and external economic, environmental, 
political and military factors, this chapter explains the outbreak, transformation and the 
prolongation of Afghanistan’s intra-state war and how the illicit production of narcotics 
became socio-economically entrenched between 1980 and 1992.  
A. AFGHAN NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN A HISTORICAL SETTING 
For centuries, Afghanistan has cultivated Papaver somniferum, widely known as 
opium poppy. Some historians suggest Alexander the Great and his invading army first 
introduced opium poppy to South Asia during their conquest of the region between 327 
BC–325 BC, although others propose Arabs first introduced opium poppy to India during 
the seventh century after conquering Spain, Egypt, Asia Minor, Persia, Turkestan and 
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certain parts of India.71 However, the first time opium is documented explicitly from a 
medicinal viewpoint comes much later in 1200 CE.72 The medicinal properties of opium, 
the liquid sap extracted from the egg-shaped poppy pod a few weeks after its flower 
petals drop off, have been known to mankind since prehistoric times.73 When ingested, 
opium provides four unique medicinal properties; appetite suppression, hyper-analgesic 
(pain relief), diarrhea prevention/alleviation and is one of the best-known cough 
suppressants. The medicinal value of opium is what likely led to its wide-scale social and 
cultural acceptance throughout Central Asia, which like most of the developing world, 
struggled to access potable water sources (diarrhea is commonly acquired to those 
consuming contaminated water sources), faced food insecurity during long winter 
seasons (and in mountainous locales), and suffered with the rest of the world during the 
tuberculosis epidemic in the 1850s.  
Afghanistan traditionally produced enough opium for its own domestic 
consumption, both medicinally and recreationally. In 1932, British officials recorded the 
first scientific measure of opium produced in Afghanistan; 75 tons harvested from 
approximately 4,000 hectares of land.74 Afghanistan’s monarchy at the time did little in 
the way of discouraging or preventing the production of opium or cannabis resin, better 
known regionally as hashish or charas. The monarchy eventually prohibited opium 
production in 1945 with mixed results, although Afghanistan’s annual output dropped to 
12 tons by 1956.75 This trend would prove to be short-lived.  
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Regional factors including exuberant levels of Iranian opium consumption and the 
influx of Western tourists into the region beginning in the 1960s helped expand 
Afghanistan’s narcotics industry while fulfilling the demands of regional addicts. 
Although Iran itself has cultivated opium poppy since the eleventh century, addiction did 
not become a problem until the twentieth century.76 In response to his country’s spiraling 
rates of opium addiction, some two million opium addicts of which collectively 
consumed two tons of opium a day, the shah of Iran prohibited opium production in 
1955.77 Afghanistan and Pakistan soon filled Iran’s market demand, producing more 
opium and hashish for export, a move Afghanistan’s king fully encouraged by facilitating 
the delivery of chemical fertilizers to cannabis farmers to help enhance the yields in 1969 
and 1970.78  
American and European smugglers facilitated the movement of Afghan hash 
throughout the world until U.S. drug enforcement officials setup an office in Kabul in 
1971 to help curb the growing proliferation of Afghan hash and the production of 
“honey-oil,” a highly potent liquid hashish extract manufactured by an American drug 
syndicate dubbed “the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.” The problem had become 
epidemic. By the early 1970s, between 5,000 and 6,000 “hippies” lived in Kabul alone.79 
In 1973, Afghanistan accepted $47 million from the U.S. government to destroy opium 
and hashish production. This contract prompted one of the last royal decrees issued by 
King Zahir Shah, prohibiting any further cannabis or poppy cultivation, before his cousin 
Mohammad Daoud removed him from power in a bloodless-coup.80 In one of the earliest 
recorded campaigns of forced crop eradication in Afghanistan’s history, Afghan soldiers 
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stormed the cannabis producing regions of Mazar-i-Sharif and parts of Kandahar, 
destroying and burning cannabis crops, farmers’ homes, and arresting and killing farmers 
and laborers throughout the traditional growing regions. For approximately two years 
afterwards, Afghanistan produced little hashish, with almost none of it making it to the 
international export circuit. In 1970, three years prior to the prohibition and forced 
eradication campaign, Afghanistan produced approximately 30% of the world’s hashish 
production; accounting for more hashish production than Pakistan (20%) and Lebanon 
(25%).81 
Afghanistan’s strategic placement along the famed “hippy-trail,” an overland 
route that western tourists took from Europe to India in the 1960s and 1970s, partially 
explains the reason why syndicates like the Brotherhood set up shop in Kabul. Additional 
factors enticed globally minded drug entrepreneurs like the Brotherhood to Kabul; 
Afghanistan’s ancient tradition of narcotics cultivation, the monarchy’s inconsistent 
regulations on narcotics production and consumption coupled with its weak institutions 
and limited reach into the hinterlands. Increased narcotics production and a higher 
demand from Iranian drug consumers indicated Afghanistan would likely become a 
major regional producer of illicit drugs for the foreseeable future. Similarly, Pakistan’s 
opium production also catered to the Iranian market, increasing from 90 tons in 1971, to 
500 tons in 1978, and culminating with a record 800 tons in 1979.82  
The aggressive state actions against Afghanistan’s cannabis production, and to a 
lesser extent its opium production, forced many farmers to move their cultivation 
operations away from main roadways and into walled compounds or more remote and 
rugged areas. Traditional cannabis grow areas, such as Mazar-i-Sharif and Kandahar, 
soon fell way to the eastern provinces of Paktia and Nangarhar, which substantially 
increased their output of cannabis. The geopolitics of Afghanistan’s narcotics production 
would later hold major implications for Afghanistan’s surge in opium production. 
Additionally, the illicit transit routes from Pakistan to Afghanistan supplying lethal aid to 
the Afghan mujahedeen (“soldiers of God,” indigenous resistance groups) would later 
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facilitate the movement of narcotics out of Afghanistan as weapons and ammunition 
flowed into the country. Both elements would help create a three-tiered economy based 
on conflict, profit making, and survival.  
B. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL HEROIN 
MARKET 
By the late 1970s, Afghanistan’s reliable drug markets in Iran and Pakistan were 
soon disrupted after a series of changes occurred in the international heroin market.83 The 
world’s global supply of heroin largely originated from two opium-producing regions at 
the time, the co-called Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle.84 South American 
produced heroin did not become a factor until much later. For instance, Colombia first 
reported the cultivation of opium poppy as late as 1986.85  
Several major shifts occurred in 1979 that disrupted the global heroin market. 
First, the Islamic Revolution swept through Iran, putting an end to the unpopular 
monarchy and ushering in a new era of Islamic fundamentalism and political uncertainty. 
Iranian opium production surged in the chaos following Iran’s rapid regime change, in 
effect ending the market domination from Afghan-produced opium. At nearly the same 
time, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and temporarily sealed off and disrupted 
Afghanistan’s traditional drug trade routes into Iran. For nearly the next decade, Iran’s 
capacity for counter-narcotics operations was largely hampered by the ferocious eight-
year war with Iraq; although the 200 to 400 tons of opium Iran produced each year during 
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the war became insufficient for its spiraling rate of domestic opium and heroin 
consumption.86 The surge in Afghan produced heroin, as well as the large number of 
Afghans living in Iranian refugee camps during the 1980s, eventually rejuvenated and 
galvanized the pipeline of Afghan opiates entering Iran.87  
Elsewhere, the traditional opium-producing region in Southeast Asia, known as 
“the Golden Triangle,” faced severe drought and protracted political instability during the 
1970s.88 Drought was responsible for decreasing the Golden Triangle’s opium output 
from 700 tons in 1971 to 160 tons in 1979 and 225 tons in 1980.89 Both Vietnam and 
Laos collapsed in the mid-1970s, significantly disrupting the flow of opium and narcotics 
from the Golden Triangle to the United States and Western Europe, at the time the most 
prolific consumers of heroin in the world.90 Turkey, in conjunction with increased U.S. 
pressure, began to crack down effectively on its illicit opium markets, a diversionary 
byproduct of Turkey’s licit (pharmaceutical) opium industry, while Pakistan’s Islamist 
military regime began to implement stricter control measures against its illicit opium 
production in it borderlands, which substantially impacted the amount of opium Pakistan 
produced. Following the record measurement of 800 tons of opium produced in 1979, 
Pakistan decreased its opium output to 75–150 tons in 1980 and 40–70 tons by 1985.91 
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Figure 2.   A Snapshot of Opium Production in the Golden Triangle and Golden 
Crescent Regions during the 1970s and 1980s.92 
 1971 1979 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 
Afghanistan 150–250 250–300 300 450* 400–800 700–800 585 
Pakistan 90 500 800 40–70 190–220 190–220 130 
Iran N/A 270–300 400–600 200-400 200-400 200–400 300 
Golden 
Triangle 
700 160 225 622–722 
(1984) 
1095–1575 1298–1833 3050 
“Golden Triangle” includes Burma, Thailand and Laos. Afghanistan’s low production figure for 1984 (160 
tons) was due to a nationwide drought, which significantly affected opium yields. 
*Denotes approximation from UNDCP records.  
Table 4.   Sampling of Opium Production (metric tons) According to the U.N. 
Commission of Narcotics Drugs and the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) Data.  
                                                 
92 The International Handbook on Drug Control, ed. Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zargarias 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992); Henman, Lewis, and Maylon, Big Deal: The Politics of the Illicit 
Drugs Business; Freemantle, “The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade. 
 38
Afghanistan, while temporarily losing its traditional market share in Iran, acted 
quickly to fill the narcotics needs of the United States and Europe and converted their 
industry from merely opium production to heroin processing. The first clandestine heroin 
processing facility in Afghanistan is believed to have been established sometime in 1971 
by a rogue German chemist who migrated to the eastern province of Nangarhar; a fertile 
farming area which cultivated large amounts of opium poppy and connects with Pakistan 
through the Khyber Pass/Torkham Pass; a historically vital trade route.93 With the help of 
foreign chemists, Afghanistan’s narcotics industry soon included morphine base 
extraction and heroin processing, although the crude forms of heroin were largely 
restricted to “number 3 heroin,” also known as “heroin rocks;” pebble shaped pieces of 
pure heroin that is heated and its vapors inhaled.  
Traditionally, smoking heroin is the most preferred method of consumption 
among Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani addicts. The purity level of heroin base or other 
types meant for smoking measures between 60% and 90%.94 The much more notorious 
type of heroin, “China White” or “number four” heroin, (dissolved with water and 
injected directly into the bloodstream), is more complicated to make in clandestine field 
workshops and did not become prevalent in Afghanistan until much later. DEA officials 
have claimed that heroin-processing facilities in Afghanistan were still relatively 
uncommon until 1984 when approximately 40 such processing workshops were thought 
to be operating in Nangarhar province, some of which could produce “China White” 
heroin hydrochloride.95 At this time, Pakistan still remained a key destination for Afghan 
opium to be transformed into higher grades of heroin. Traffickers routinely smuggled 
opium across the border to processing workshops under the protection of General Fazle 
Haq, then the Governor of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). By 1988, nearly  
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200 “heroin refineries” were operating in the Khyber Agency, an administrative subunit 
of the NWFP and an area that shared the frontier border with Afghanistan’s Nangarhar 
province.96  
C. INTERNAL FACTORS THAT STIMULATED NARCOTICS 
PRODUCTION  
Four internal factors played an important role in the rise of opium production 
throughout the 1980s: the intentional destruction of Afghanistan’s agriculture 
infrastructure, the lack of state control throughout most of Afghanistan’s hinterlands, the 
high profitability of opium compared to licit crops, and Afghanistan’s comparative 
advantage to cultivate opium poppy due in part to the physical characteristics of opium 
poppy itself.  
1. Poppy: Comparative Advantages and Characteristics  
During the intra-state war period, Afghanistan lost one-third of its population due 
to conflict-initiated displacement, which led to a decrease in agricultural experts and 
laborers needed to maintain the production of licit crops. In turn, Afghan farmers slowly 
turned toward opium poppy; a hardy, nearly drought resistant crop that has a high weight 
to profit ratio, a high market demand, is non-perishable and does not require safe 
handling during transportation or refrigeration.97 Importantly, opium poppy has a shorter 
grow-cycle than food crops like wheat, allowing farmers to double-crop with livestock 
fodder, such as maize following the opium harvest (typically in May). Poppy straw, the 
dried stalk left over after the opium has been extracted, can be recycled as home-heating 
fuel, saving some farmers nearly a quarter of their annual income that would have 
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otherwise been spent on home-heating costs.98 In fact, nearly all parts of the poppy plant 
are used. In addition to the dried straw and the opium latex extracted from the pod, poppy 
seeds are a standard food staple and when pressed, poppy oil can be used for cooking and 
soap making. Lastly, opium stores can be used as a quasi-federal reserve in areas where 
safe and reliable banking systems are nonexistent, like in rural Afghanistan.99 
Importantly, opium provides access to credit, and in some cases, land and water 
(irrigation access), that poor farmers would otherwise be deprived of.  
Over time, the reliance on certain commodities inclined certain sub-state actors to 
prioritize economic incentives over cultural and religious values. The critical dilemma 
facing Afghan resistance leaders and their participation in the production of opium is its 
contradiction to Islam, which considers such intoxicants haram (forbidden). Some clever 
counter-narratives and religious justification from resistance leaders who began to 
dominate and monopolize opium-producing regions under their control would overcome 
this paradox. Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, a cleric from northern Helmand Province who 
became a key resistance commander for Harakat-i-Inqelabi-Islami Afghanistan, 
represents the greatest example of insurgent acceptance, alliance, and then full-fledged 
participation in the narcotics trade. Nasim issued a fatwa in 1981 legitimizing the 
cultivation of opium poppy and later expanded his opium empire into southern Helmand 
due to enhanced resources and manpower from his exuberant profits.100 Those farmers 
who opposed his demands were allegedly tortured and some killed; and many of the 
khans from Helmand were expelled or murdered by his militia. Despite his assassination 
in 1990 by narco-rivals linked with Hezb-i-Islami, Nasim’s Akhundzada clan went on to 
dominate the Helmand Valley’s opium empire until the Taliban forced them out in 1995 
only to have Sher Muhammad Akhundzada resume the Helmand opium dynasty 
following the Taliban’s ouster in 2002.  
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2. The Targeting of Afghanistan’s Agriculture Sector  
Aside from influential factors from the international heroin market, Afghanistan’s 
increase in opium poppy cultivation itself can be directly associated with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 and the subsequent civil war. The onset 
of intrastate war coincided with the Soviet invasion, prompting a mass exodus of Afghans 
into Pakistan and Iran. Fierce resistance, particularly in the rural areas, provoked harsh 
retaliations from the Soviet military that targeted farms and orchards, harvests, and 
irrigation systems and canals. Soviet operations led to the destruction of one-quarter to 
one-third of all the irrigation systems; nearly two-thirds of all villages bombed, and 
livestock fell 77% between 1979 and 1989.101 In addition to the Soviet’s targeted 
destruction of agricultural infrastructure, rival mujahedeen factions were also responsible 
for mining and destroying karez (underground aqueducts) and above ground irrigation 
ditches and canals belonging to their communal or political rivals, causing a severe 
disruption in water distribution that forced farmers to seek out alternative high-value 
crops that consumed little water, like opium poppy.102  
The impact of the conflict and subsequent Soviet scorched-earth operations and 
mujahedeen revenge attacks against karez and canals, substantially altered Afghanistan’s 
licit agricultural output. The acreage devoted to wheat, corn, barley, rice and cotton 
drastically decreased between 1978 and 1983. Compared to 1978’s agricultural acreage 
representing 100%, the average wheat acreage dropped to an astounding 50.9% by 1981, 
and decreased to a meager 37.2% by 1982; corn followed a similar trend while cotton 
dropped to 40% in 1981 and further plummeted to 15.7% by 1982.103 By 1982, 
Afghanistan’s annual rice production decreased 65%.104  
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By 1987, analysts reported the devastation of Afghanistan’s agricultural 
infrastructure. Farmers’ access to agricultural inputs, such as improved seed, fertilizer, 
and agricultural machinery, was nearly impossible, according to Mohammad Qasim 
Yusufi, a former assistant professor at Kabul University.105 The Soviet’s scorched earth 
policy and the failure of the Communist regime in Kabul to nurture the farming sector led 
to a complete transformation of Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure, economy, and 
traditional social hierarchy.  
Opium production nearly doubled between 1982 (300 tons) and 1983 (575 tons), 
again between 1986 (350 tons) and 1987 (875 tons), and soon galvanized Afghanistan’s 
role as a global opium producer by 1991 with the production of 1,980 tons.106 It was in 
1983, a relatively early juncture in the Soviet-Afghan war, that a spokesman for the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) ominously warned, “that the mujahidin were financing 
their struggle against the Soviets at least in partly through the sale of opium.”107 U.S. law 
enforcement officials, whose forensic labs can determine the source of origin of heroin 
and other opiates, concluded that 60% of the heroin reaching the United States in 1987 
came from Afghanistan; 90% of Europe’s heroin originated from Afghan poppies.108 
3. Lack of State Control 
During the first phase of the conflict, (1979–1980), Afghan mujahedeen suffered 
tremendous battlefield casualties in light of superior Soviet firepower and 
maneuverability. The second phase of the conflict, beginning in 1980 and lasting until 
1985, is characterized by the mujahedeen’s adaptability and strategic retreat to rural 
environs. Factions loyal to the seven official resistance parties based in Peshawar, 
Pakistan established bases throughout rural Afghanistan, typically among isolated 
mountain ranges and in the agricultural districts of southern Afghanistan.  
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The ruralization of the conflict, and the subsequent reliance on asymmetrical 
warfare by the mujahedeen, plagued Soviet forces for the duration of the war. Despite the 
rise in Soviet manpower from 85,000 in 1979 to nearly 115,000 in 1984, the best the 
Soviet army and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces could do is manage 
daytime control of the major population centers, urban areas, main communication links 
and “certain fortified strong points.”109 In contrast, the mujahedeen resistance controlled 
the bulk of the Afghanistan, especially the rural environs. Soviet-Afghan war expert 
Anthony Arnold posits the mujahedeen strongly influenced or actually controlled these 
areas around 80–90% during the daytime and virtually 100% after dark.110 A Russian 
General Staff Report detailing the Soviet-Afghan war, an authoritative historical account 
war written under the direction of Colonel Valetin Runov, admitted that the Afghan 
mujahedeen controlled “all of the main agriculture areas of the country” by 1985; Soviet 
and DRA forces controlled the cities and major road networks linking the cities indicative 
of a defensive posture.111 By 1988, the Soviet army withdrew from the strategic Panjshir 
Valley north of Kabul and ceded or lost the entire eastern border with Pakistan to the 
mujahedeen.112 The Soviets were convinced that by destroying rural villages and 
attacking the agricultural sector, many Afghans would gravitate toward the urban areas 
under Soviet and government control. This approach forced many Afghans to flee for 
neighboring countries, and by 1985, some 5,000,000 Afghans, or one-third of 
Afghanistan’s total population, were living outside the country. Remaining Afghans who 
chose to gravitate toward major urban hubs like Kabul caused a socio-economic 
conundrum for the Soviets and Afghan communists who were forced to feed this 
increasing number of internally displaced refugees. Due to an increase of attacks by the  
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resistance, heavy snows, and the Soviet withdraw in 1988, a critical food shortage 
threatened to plunge Kabul into famine. By February 1989, wheat and flour stocks in 
Kabul were down to a twelve-day supply.113 
While focusing on securing the main lines of communications, namely the ring 
road that connects Kabul with the southern cities of Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and the 
western city of Herat, and the Salang highway, which connected Kabul with the Soviet 
Union, the Afghan government and Soviet forces found it impossible to secure 
Afghanistan’s eastern frontier with Pakistan. This area not only served as a critical base 
of operations for the Afghan resistance, but also acted as the key pipeline for men, 
firepower and later narcotics coming and going from Afghanistan. In the eastern province 
of Nangarhar, opium poppy had become a major agricultural crop and combat 
commodity for resistance factions. In between 1989 and 1992, opium poppy was 
cultivated in half of Nangarhar’s districts while nearly 80% of Jalalabad’s (provincial 
capital) arable land produced nothing but opium poppy, according to UN officials.114 At 
this time, opium fetched nearly 10 times the price of wheat, and thanks to free flour 
donated by USAID; farmers could readily purchase cheap bread and other staple foods in 
town.115 
D. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFGHANISTAN’S NARCOTICS 
INDUSTRY  
Within the context of the Soviet-Afghan war and structural factors in the global 
supply of heroin, three types of overlapping economies emerged during the conflict and 
the presence of an already functioning narcotics industry. It becomes pertinent to 
examine the relationship between economic and political organizations within failed and 
fragile states or a combat setting where conflict economies inevitably become highly 
criminalized. The following analysis is based on Jonathan Goodhand’s framework of 
three economic overlaps (conflict, shadow and coping), which he first introduced by 
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examining Afghanistan’s narcotics industry during 25 years of political upheaval from 
1980 to 2005.116 He focused on three political time frames: “war-making, state-building, 
and state-collapse,” while specifically examining the role of borderland areas and its 
effect on both intra-state conflict and illicit activity. His framework remains apt. The 
following analysis implements Goodhand’s three-tier economic approach specifically to 
explain the role rise of Afghanistan’s narcotics industry between 1980 and 1992 because 
of intrastate conflict and the international heroin market discussed at length above. 
Additionally, the concepts of what constitutes a conflict economy are thoroughly defined 
and expanded upon while Goodhand’s “coping” economy is replaced with a “survival” 
economy framework to help explain the benefits of the drug trade to Afghanistan’s 
agricultural actors. The purpose of this section is to define the social organization of 
Afghanistan’s drug trade and explain what actors participated in the drug trade, how they 
benefited from it, and their motivations for participating in it. Lastly, this section aims to 
explain how Afghanistan became reliant on narcotics production between 1980 and 1992.  
1. Conflict Economy 
The evolution of conflict economies is typically a direct result of “the decay of 
states and their respective governmental structures, as well as the dissolution of the state 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, that form essential preconditions” for 
such conflict economies to emerge.117 After Afghanistan’s insurgency formulated into a 
nationwide revolt in 1981, violent armed political groups found themselves fighting in all 
of Afghanistan’s 29 provinces. The United States and Saudi Arabia, in conjunction with 
Pakistan’s government and its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), helped bankroll the 
Afghan resistance movement by providing financial assistance and later tremendous 
resources, such as modern weaponry, ammunition, explosives and man-portable air 
defense systems (MANPADS), such as the British Blow-pipe and U.S. FM-92 “Stinger 
missile.”  
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Pakistan also facilitated the creation of seven state recognized and supported 
tanzim to help coordinate and unify the insurgency effort in Afghanistan and to enhance 
the flow of arms and money to central commands that could then disperse the funds to 
resistance fronts inside Afghanistan. Cronyism, greed, and graft plagued the Pakistani 
program, leaving large caches of supplies on the black-market and inconsistent flows of 
supplies to the front. Some front line commanders and mid-level leaders in Afghanistan 
soon turned to illicit activities for supplemental income and the opportunity to gain 
independence from their Peshawar-based patrons who increasingly engaged in self-
indulgent infighting and preoccupied their forces with acquiring wealth and political 
prestige. In sum, the external funding and the allocation of lethal aid from international 
donors to the resistance leadership in Peshawar does not equate to its even distribution 
among warring militias inside Afghanistan. Secondary or supplemental avenues of 
income and the emergence of micro-level conflict economies surfaced despite the 
exuberant level of international donations pouring into the resistance at the time.  
The militarization of Afghan society usurped the traditional role of tribal elders 
and landed elites (khans) and the village liaison to the government (maliks). Radical 
government issued land reforms, and land redistribution policies beginning in 1978 tore 
Afghanistan’s traditional social fabric, marginalizing the malik and khan system; heavy 
fighting and scorched earth operations forced many tribal leaders and khans to leave 
Afghanistan along with their families. These events propelled local military commanders 
and the village mullahs into achieved social statuses procured from battlefield feats and 
religious guidance, respectively. As Giustozzi notes, the transformation of Afghanistan’s 
social and economic structures allowed these military commanders to develop 
autonomous economic and social bases, essentially turning them into the “new Khans,” 
or “Islamic Khans,” in the sense of the militarized religious leaders.118 Traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the jirga, also became militarized; no longer did 
charisma and mediation skills mean as much as firepower, coercion, and newly found 
financial wealth.  
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The power of the commanders and mullahs would transcend into territorial 
ownership and led to disputes over resources, smuggling routes, finances, manpower, 
ideology, doctrine, and tactics. The consolidation of power led to the manifestation of 
“mini-statelets” where commanders controlled villages, portions of districts, or in some 
cases, several districts at once. Since no industrial production existed, and no 
administrative or other services on which to impose taxes, militias began to exploit illicit 
activities like smuggling and trafficking along routes through their territory and in some 
areas collected taxes from famers cultivating opium poppy. 
By first accepting illicit activities in the areas under their control, these 
commanders and militias began to engage in a host of illicit activities to maintain their 
positions of power and enhance their means to wage warfare. As Keen posits, “economic 
violence is violence from which short term profit is made. Its motivation may not 
necessarily be purely economic. It may be encouraged or tolerated for political reasons, 
although ultimately it is provoked to defend economic privileges.”119  
2. Shadow Economy  
The importance of the gray market, services provided that are fusions between 
licit activity and criminal enterprise, plays a major role in the efficiency and sustainment 
of the illicit economy. The absence of landowners in the countryside following the 
political and social upheaval during the Soviet-Afghan war prompted new opportunities 
for landless or lower class peasants. Absentee landlords would rent land to the lower 
strata in exchange for certain opium quotas, allowing farmers to produce food crops for 
their families and acquire earnings for the production of opium.  
Although a key player within the conflict economy, Nasim’s actions greatly 
facilitated the shadow economy, which is comprised of those financially benefiting from 
illicit activities but whose ultimate ambitions are not necessarily the ability to wage war 
but to make profit. In conjunction with Nasim’s monopoly on the opium trade, he 
claimed in a 1987 interview to have reinvested some of his opium profits by establishing 
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hospitals, clinics and 40 madrassahs.120 Those hired to work in and manage these 
facilities, whether intentionally or not, became critical components in the shadow 
economy.  
Another important factor in the shadow economy derived from conflict and 
narcotics production is the transit industry. While politically weak and heavily taxed in 
the 1950s, the “merchant class” and transport sector rose to prominence in the 1980s and 
1990s due to their close ties with resistance groups.121 Although the personality most 
associated with developing an opium dynasty in southern Afghanistan is certainly Mullah 
Nasim Akhundzada, other commanders like Esmatullah Muslim, a renegade warlord who 
fought with the mujahedeen before defecting to the communist regime in 1984, 
controlled most of the illicit smuggling industry in Kandahar Province.122 Esmatullah’s 
network and other transport groups established business partnerships and communal ties 
among the resettled Pashtuns communities in Quetta and Peshawar, while establishing 
connections in Dubai and many parts of India, all of which would later prove detrimental 
in facilitating the transnational movement of narcotics throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Similarly, some actors like businessmen and resistance leaders, invested in opium 
refinement workshops and clandestine heroin processing “laboratories,” which increased 
profits of illicit opiates between 125 and 1,000%.123 The most noticeable investor among 
the mujahedeen parties at the time was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, who 
controlled at least six heroin refinement workshops in Kho-i-Sultan (southwestern 
Pakistan), and who stimulated both the conflict and shadow economy at the same time.124 
The most negative outcome of a burgeoning shadow economy is its focus on short-tem 
gains and lack of long-term investments within the society and infrastructure. On the 
other hand, actors within the shadow economy may be more inclined to support peace 
proposals as long as peace maintains their ability to make profits.125  
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3. Survival Economy  
As Goodhand suggests, “households can be divided into those who profit (add to 
their asset base), those who cope (non-erosion of asset base) and those who survive at a 
declining level of well being (erosion of asset base).”126 The overall number of 
households that fall into each category has changed over time given trends in fighting, 
access to improved seed varieties and markets, as well as environmental factors like 
rainfall and drought; however, it is accurate to identify the survival category as the most 
prominent of the three. In many instances, farmers do not stand to make great profits 
from cultivating opium poppy. However, opium poppy cultivation does offer several 
incentives for poor farmers; access to land and credit that would otherwise be 
unavailable, a short grow season that allows for double cropping, and an easily 
transportable non-perishable commodity.  
Those who stand to make the most profit from opium production beings with 
small-scale traders and investors who front farmers’ money in advance, known as the 
salaam system, for a low market price and a certain weight quota. These traders have the 
option of holding opium stores and selling large quantities when the market prices are 
most profitable; lower-scale producers and farmers are typically forced to unload their 
stores of opium shortly after it is produced. The salaam system is one preferred by 
warlords and militia commanders; it fosters a strong patron client relationship and helps 
mobilize forces in support of the commander in times of social upheaval and conflict. 
Salaam can also lock the rural farmer into a seemingly never-ending cycle of debt and 
fortitude. If opium quotas are unmet, due to weather and environmental factors or a 
shortfall in field labor, the farmer is obliged to reschedule his payment and produce more 
opium the following season. Inevitably, the farmer will need to borrow more money to 
survive through the year, creating another borrow-debt-repay cycle reliant on 
environmental factors and farming capabilities. This debt cycle increases the quotas for 
opium production, which leads to the limiting of crop choices for many households.127 
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The lack of available, viable and functioning national and local banking systems has 
forced Afghan farmers to rely upon local traders and investors for monetary assistance 
and micro-loans. The salaam cycle emerged during the Soviet-Afghan war from powerful 
militia commanders, such as Mullah Nasim, and continued late into the 1990s, largely 
remaining in place under the Taliban regime, and survived throughout the 2000s until 
market factors and international assistance helped mitigate the salaam system by 2007–
08.  
E. CONCLUSION 
With the invasion by the Soviet Union, Afghanistan endured a litany of social, 
economic, religious, commercial/industrial and agricultural problems. The war brought 
on by the Soviet invasion led to the massive disruption of agricultural production factors, 
such as labor force, fertilizers, irrigation access, improved seed varieties, farming 
machinery, and proper farming techniques and land maintenance.128 The resulting 
militarization of Afghan society helped propel nontraditional social statuses into 
community leadership positions, namely the militia commander and the mullah, setting 
the stage for both the extension of conflict following the Soviet withdraw in 1989 and the 
state’s ultimate collapse in 1992. The enhanced position of the mullah allowed initially 
for greater mobilization of forces based on Islamic rhetoric and unity, but would later 
inspire a new generation of war-experienced fundamentalists to appear when the Taliban 
emerged from “obscurity” in the spring of 1994.  
The long-standing tradition of narcotics cultivation would become a key source of 
income for militias that exploited the survival economy established by those who stayed 
in Afghanistan during the period of conflict. Opportunists like smugglers, traders, 
traffickers, processors and chemists fulfilled key positions within the narcotics trade and 
benefited financially from it, creating a new era of job opportunities based on grey or 
black market activities. Structural changes in the global heroin market preceding the 
Soviet invasion and during the conflict, helped transform Afghanistan’s role in the 
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international heroin trade and facilitated the fight over territory, resources, and access to 
the drug trade during the destructive civil war period following the collapse of the state 
between 1992 and 1994. According to USAID, “because of the magnitudes of the profits 
involved and because on the extralegal nature of their activities, the narcotics-trading 
enterprises almost necessarily become armed centers of parallel economic and political 
power.”129 Simply put, the economic agendas of armed political groups and other sub-
state actors, fused with quasi-political ambitions, including the domination of local 
territory, fueled Afghanistan’s conflict throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. Following 
the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, these underlying economic agendas have 
only complicated the socio-economic and political situation further. Many of the former 
sub-state actors are now key government officials or influential businessmen who 
straddle the line between criminal enterprise, formal businessmen, and politicians. 
Armed Polities Interaction with the Drug Trade 1980–1992 
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and size of the illicit 
narcotics industry? 
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Table 5.   Armed Polities Interaction with the Drug Trade 1980–1992 
                                                 
129 C. Wolters, “Rural Development and Opium Production Lessons Learned in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan,” USAID Draft memo, August 20, 1992.  
 52
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53
IV.  THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD AND THE RISE OF NARCO-
FUNDAMENTALISM (1992–2001) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Politics, Islam and narcotics have been major components to the instability and 
open warfare endured by Afghanistan since the 1970s. The rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the industrialization of the narcotics industry took precedence in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war from the mid 1980s onward. Islamism and 
conflict fueled Afghanistan’s political landscape, shaping the organizational constructs of 
several key opposition factions locked in combat against the Communist Afghan regime 
and their Soviet backers.130 Although the narcotics industry helped fund the jihad, 
financial aid and lethal aid from abroad eclipsed the importance of the narcotics trade 
until international support came to an end following the Soviet’s withdraw and the 
collapse of the Communist regime in 1992. With little aid trickling in, warring factions 
turned to illicit commodities like smuggling and the drug trade to bolster their arsenals in 
a fierce competition to consolidate political power during a bloody two-year civil war 
(1992–1994).  
The rise of the puritanical Islamist Taliban movement in 1994 amidst a 
burgeoning drug trade in the same region (Kandahar province) provides the first possible 
account of an “Islamic narco-state,” or as Maley suggests, “narco-fundamentalism.”131 
To contextualize properly the Taliban’s puzzling decision to prohibit poppy cultivation in 
its fifth year of power, the author conducts a historical analysis focusing on three specific 
periods, the Taliban’s rise and consolidation of power between 1994 and 1996, the 
Taliban government era (1996–2000), and the Taliban’s decision to outlaw the cultivation 
of poppy between July 2000 and September 2001.  
                                                 
130 The most radical of the Islamist movements in Afghanistan at the time included Hezb-i-Islami led 
by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ittehad-e Islami led by Abdul-Rab al Rasul Sayyaf, while two clerical 
organizations formed under the direction of well-respected alem, included Hezb-i-Islami (Maluvi Khalis 
faction) and Harakat-e Enqalab-e Islami led by Maluvi Mohammad Nabi Mohamaddi.  
131 Maley, “Interpreting the Taliban,” in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, 2–3. 
 54
Three components of contemporary Afghan politics in concert with the narcotics 
industry are scrutinized for the scope of this chapter: the organizational construct and 
origins of the fundamentalist Taliban movement, the political motivations of the group, 
and domestic and international political factors. An analysis of all three elements help to 
understand better how a conservative and puritanical Islamist movement like the Taliban 
encouraged and facilitated the illicit narcotics industry in Afghanistan for nearly five 
years and help explains why the movement finally endorsed a prohibition of poppy 
cultivation during the grow season of 2000.132 Did the Taliban’s counternarcotics 
program derive from the implementation of Shari’ah, which prohibits activities like drug 
use and production, or was the Taliban’s ban as Labrousse suggests, a “pseudo-
campaign;” political theater staged for the benefit of potential international donors while 
impacting the opium industry very little?133  
B. 1994–1996: OPIUM, ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN AND ITS 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT  
Since the early 1960s, Afghanistan experienced the dual rise of secularism and 
Islamic fundamentalism. The volatile political situation led to a series of coups d’état 
between 1978 and 1979, climaxing when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 
December 24, 1979. Subsequent civil wars and neglect have laid waste to the most of 
Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy. These conditions eroded many of 
Afghanistan’s traditional social and tribal mechanisms, replacing the important roles held 
by tribal elders and khans (landed elites) with tanzim (military faction) commanders and 
mullahs. This shift significantly altered local power structures, militarized local dispute 
resolution means, such as the shura and jirga systems, and prompted many of these 
commanders to engage in criminal activity and drug production as a means of increasing 
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and maintaining wealth, power and influence. These commanders, especially Mullah 
Nasim Ahkundzada of Helmand Province, dubbed “the King of heroin,” forced local 
communities to produce fixed amounts of opium; those who disobeyed were often 
arrested, mutilated or killed by his militia faction.134 The cultivation of poppy and 
production of opium soared during the 1980s as commanders like Nasim began to expand 
further and further into criminal enterprise.135 Opium production nearly doubled between 
1982 (300 tons) and 1983 (575 tons), again between 1986 (350 tons) and 1987 (875 tons), 
and soon galvanized Afghanistan’s role as a global opium producer by 1991 with the 
production of 1,980 tons.136 Upon the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989 and the 
drying up of international funding to the rebels by 1992, Afghanistan endured a bloody 
civil war that further destroyed the country and its infrastructure; transitioning the 
economy from a war economy to an entrenched narco-economy by 1993. The failure of 
the interim government, comprised from the seven major resistance parties, to 
consolidate power and govern the country led to a dark age of anarchy and chaos from 
1992 to 1994.  
In the spring of 1994, residents of southern Afghanistan lived in fear from 
marauding units of militiamen who routinely robbed, kidnapped, raped and extorted the 
local population. In Kandahar’s lawless western districts, rumors whirled of militiamen 
kidnapping two young girls and bringing them to a militia camp where they were 
repeatedly raped. As the legend goes, shortly after the news spread of the kidnappings, a 
local village cleric named Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund led a small group of his 
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armed taliban (religious students) and attacked the militia encampment, freed the two 
girls and killed those responsible; hanging the militia commander from a tank barrel for 
all to see.137 Mullah Omar and his small band of fighters began to attack other criminal 
gangs and militia checkpoints around Kandahar City, acquiring arms and ammunition 
along the way. Mullah Omar’s “Robin-Hood” persona swelled with each passing victory.  
Among those most enthused about the increase in security were members of the 
affluent Pakistani trucking mafia, referred to by intelligence officials as the “Quetta 
Alliance,” a network of Pashtun businessmen, smugglers, and criminals located in Quetta 
(Pakistan), a major population center 130-miles southeast of Kandahar City. In 1993, 
before Mullah Omar’s crusade against crime began, reporter Ahmad Rashid described 
being stopped by various militia checkpoints at least 20 times between Quetta and 
Kandahar, each time paying a “transit tariff.”138 The trucking mafia, eager to expand 
commercial linkages between Pakistan and the newly independent Central Asian state of 
Turkmenistan, began to support the fledging Taliban movement financially. The most 
significant support came from Haji Bashir Noorzai, a powerful Pashtun tribal leader from 
Kandahar’s Maiwand district and the owner of the small village mosque Mullah Omar 
preached at in Sangersar village. Haji Bashir and Mullah Omar’s relationship dates back 
to the 1980s when both men fought against the Soviet occupation under the Hezb-i-Islami 
(Khalis faction) tanzim.139 Additionally, Haji Bashir Noorzai is the son of Issa Noorzai, 
who at the time played a major leadership role in the Quetta Alliance trucking and 
smuggling mafia. 
Mullah Omar approached Haji Bashir in the summer of 1994 and related to him a 
vision he had in which the Prophet Muhammad told him the need to bring peace to 
Afghanistan, according to declassified U.S. embassy cables from Islamabad. Haji Bashir 
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believed Omar, and “drawing upon family resources and local business and political 
connections,” donated $250,000, six pick-up trucks and an undisclosed amount of arms 
and ammunition to Omar and his militia.140 Following the logistical and financial 
support, Mullah Omar’s militia swelled to 200 men and they soon controlled the 
Maiwand district and took over the local government administration. Maiwand is a 
historic poppy producing district and the stronghold of Haji Bashir Noorzai, whose 
kinship dominated the region’s poppy farming, trading and trafficking network for 
generations. The relationship between Haji Bashir Noorzai and Mullah Omar remained 
strong throughout the 1990s.  
Bashir maintained a heavy influence on Mullah Omar’s majlis-shura, of which 
according to former classified U.S. documents; Bashir was also a founding and 
participating member.141 Also pertinent to note is that Haji Bashir’s influence and 
financial support for Omar and the Taliban predates the state sponsorship offered to the 
Taliban by Pakistani military and intelligence services, which occurred in October 1994 
when the Pakistani Frontier Corps helped the Taliban attack the Spin Boldak armory held 
by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami militia, and was galvanized in early November 
when the Taliban helped free a captured Pakistani government convoy from the clutches 
of two warlords holed up at Kandahar airfield.142  
The Taliban’s relationship with powerful drug lords like Haji Bashir bolstered the 
movement’s “central treasury” and helped stuff the Taliban war chest during the major 
offensives launched against Herat in the spring of 1995. Other early supporters of the 
Taliban include Ghaffar Akhundzada, a second-generation drug lord and the nephew of 
Mullah Nasim Akhundazda, Helmand’s notorious “King of Heroin.” Although Ghaffar 
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later turned on the Taliban after trying to disarm him as it moved into the Helmand 
Valley, another influential drug trafficker began to support the Taliban financially by 
1998. His name is Haji Juma Khan, a mysterious Brahui tribesman from southwestern 
Nimroz province. He eventually managed a $1 billion drug enterprise between southern 
Afghanistan and his criminal empire in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, earning himself 
the moniker “Afghanistan’s Pablo Escobar.” According to senior U.S. officials, Haji 
Juma Khan became the Taliban’s number three man before the movement’s collapse in 
October 2001.143 Khan became even more influential during the Taliban’s rebound in 
2003, supporting Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives in Pakistan with money, arms and 
explosives. He and his militia of 1,500 controlled large swaths of ungoverned territory in 
southwestern Afghanistan, posing as Taliban fighters and attacking government officials 
who interfered or threatened their drug business. In short, it is clear extremely powerful 
drug traffickers helped financially support the Taliban movement since its inception, 
providing weapons, vehicles, money and volunteers to help control territory and secure 
the roadways; a mutually beneficial relationship that continues to exist. 
In September 1996, the Taliban succeeded in conquering more than half of 
Afghanistan’s territory and secured the capital of Kabul. “In these circumstances, the 
[drug] problem [in Afghanistan] can be dealt with in ten years,” Giovanni Qauglia, the 
United Nation’s Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) director for Pakistan, declared 
shortly after the Taliban seized Kabul.144 Some experts imply the Taliban simply 
“inherited” the problem of a burgeoning narcotics industry and if given time, resources, 
and support, the religious movement could have ended Afghanistan’s addiction to its 
narco-economy.145 Three overpowering reasons exist as to why this assumption fails to 
explain properly the Taliban’s involvement in the narcotics industry. This first is that the 
Taliban’s initial supporters, both political and financial, were powerful Pakistani trucking 
mafia syndicates (the “Quetta Alliance”) and Haji Bashir Noorzai, a prolific Afghan drug 
trader and son of Quetta Alliance leader Issa Noorzai. The second is that the opium trade 
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filled the Taliban’s war chest and helped them launch major military offensives early on 
in Herat (1995). The third is that the Taliban quickly realized they could not end poppy 
cultivation for fear of losing significant political capital; entirely too many Afghans relied 
on the narcotics industry for poverty alleviation and food security. In fact, the decision to 
ban poppy in 2000, a time of serious drought, amounted to political and economic 
suicide. Leading up to the ban, Taliban leaders accurately stated any attempts to ban 
poppy cultivation would have dire consequences among their rural support networks and 
destroy hundreds of thousands of livelihoods.146 Between 1996 and 2000, the Taliban 
took careful steps to strengthen, if not fully encourage, the production of poppy and the 
refinement of heroin of which they took generous cuts of by imposing Islamic “taxes” on 
both.  
C. 1997–2000: STREAMLINING OPIUM PRODUCTION AND HEROIN 
PROCESSING  
In 1994 and 1997, the Taliban issued statements outlawing the processing of 
heroin, but in practice, the Taliban rarely intervened against heroin production.147 The 
Taliban began its participation in the drug industry by first accepting and then taxing 
poppy farmers at the farm-gate; slowly expanding its taxation to those who transported 
the opium and to those who operated heroin processing facilities. Taliban officials 
justified their allowance of poppy cultivation largely through Islamic justification or plain 
ignorance; some officials saw no difference between the taxing of wheat and the taxing of 
poppy. Most of the confusion emanated from the Taliban’s lack of understanding of 
opium, which they saw as a vice of non-Muslims and non-Afghans. “Opium [production] 
is permissible because it is consumed by kaffirs (unbelievers) in the West and not by 
Afghans and Muslims,” the Taliban counter-narcotics chief famously told reporters in 
1997.148 The usage of hashish, however, was strictly forbidden by the Taliban beginning 
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in 1994; considered a “vice among Afghans,” and remained so until its ouster in 2001. 
Those caught consuming, cultivating or trafficking hashish were often subjected to severe 
beating, water torture and imprisonment. 
Afghanistan has produced opium on an upward trajectory since the early 1980s, 
but the refinement of opium into heroin, which results in far higher profit margins, 
traditionally occurred in lawless areas of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. This changed in 1995 
after the Pakistani military launched a narcotics offensive across the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area, closing down many of the clandestine refinement labs, some 
200 of which were thought to be operational in Khyber Agency alone.149 The crackdown 
resulted in the industry being pushed over the Afghan border where neighboring tribes 
filled the production gaps in districts like Shinwar and Achin.  
During the Taliban’s reign of power from 1996–2001, heroin-processing labs 
operated at full capacity throughout Afghanistan in areas under and outside the control of 
the Taliban. Afghanistan’s northeastern region and certain districts in Nangarhar were 
largely outside the control of the Taliban government throughout its time in power. 
Heroin processing that shifted from Pakistan’s tribal region found a logical home in 
eastern Nangarhar province, an area that lies adjacent to Pakistan’s Khyber Agency. The 
Shinwari and Afridi tribes comprise a majority of the population on both sides of the 
border and both tribes have deeply entrenched network ties with smuggling and drug 
trafficking syndicates dating back to Afghanistan’s first heroin processing lab in 
Nangarhar’s Shinwar district in 1971.150 Heroin processing also occurred in northeastern 
Badakhshan province, an area held by Ahmad Shah Massoud’s anti-Taliban Shura-ye 
nazar (council of supervision) at the time.  
In 1996, heroin-processing workshops continued to operate without interference 
in areas directly under Taliban control in Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz despite an 
earlier Taliban decree outlawing the processing of heroin.151 The fact that heroin 
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production occurred in areas under and outside the control of the Taliban is reflective of 
the lack of political stability during the Taliban’s rise to power between 1994 and 1997. 
In 1998, information obtained by the Australian Federal Police liaison officer in 
Islamabad found the Taliban created official government licenses that permitted the 
cultivation of poppy and the production of opium, an indication the Taliban attempted to 
regulate the industry.152 According to numerous farmers in southern Afghanistan, a year 
prior to the Australian Federal Police findings, the Taliban distributed fertilizer to help 
enhance the growth of poppy and increase its opium output.153 
The Taliban collected tax on the cultivation of poppy, but also on the production 
of opium from both the traders and the traffickers, justifying its involvement in the 
industry by labeling the tax in religious terms. Initially, the Taliban collected zakat, a 
traditional 2.5% from an individual’s earnings, but this varied wildly depending on the 
region and commanders involved. Additionally, the traditional Islamic tithe of 
agricultural products, called ushr, prompted the Taliban to collect 10% of a farmer’s 
overall output. As Rashid notes, “by taxing both opium production and trafficking, the 
Taliban became the first Afghan government to tax agriculture, which no previous regime 
had had the capacity to do.”154 Asa Hutchinson, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s 
Director in 2002, revealed the Taliban kept elaborate ledger and tax receipt forms, again 
suggesting the Taliban government played a direct role in attempting to regulate the 
industry.155 Similar to Hutchinson’s claims, American journalists obtained similar tax 
receipts in 1999 during a report on the drug industry in eastern Afghanistan.156 
Despite tough talk from Taliban officials at the time regarding the prohibition of 
heroin production, the Taliban charged a tax to those in charge of refining opium into 
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higher grades of heroin. According to Zuber, an Afghan “chemist” who helped refine 
opium into heroin at a workshop in eastern Nangarhar province, the Taliban taxed the 
production of morphine base and heroin in 1999; charging $55 per kilogram of finished 
product.157 McCoy also notes that at the time, the Taliban accepted the operation of 
dozens of heroin processing workshops in Nangarhar and were paid $70 per kilogram of 
heroin. The Taliban also extended its tax to those who trafficked narcotics. According to 
a former top secret document obtained from the U.S. government published in 1998, the 
son of a key “‘Quetta Alliance’” member paid the Taliban $230 for each kilogram of 
either heroin or morphine base being exported through the Jalalabad (Nangarhar) or 
Qandahar airports.”158 The document also indicates that during March 1998, Taliban 
leadership instructed its officials in several provinces to help increase poppy cultivation 
and encourage the production of opium. Six new “heroin-processing laboratories” were 
established in Taliban controlled areas (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan). Twenty-nine such 
labs were said to have been functional in Helmand alone, up from 23 in February of 
1998, and an additional 28 were said to be operational in eastern Nangarhar, also under 
“Taliban control” although details of the locations of these labs were not disclosed.  
Again, McCoy suggests that in 1998, the Taliban’s biggest contribution to the 
drug industry rested in the facilitation and acceptance of heroin processing sites, of which 
some 200 “kitchens” existed in Nangarhar alone.  
In February 1999, the Taliban made headlines when the movement sent militia 
fighters on a seek-and-destroy mission in Nangarhar to wipe out clandestine heroin 
refinement factories. The Taliban’s counternarcotics efforts shut down 34 processing 
sites in the presence of foreign observers and 25 in Helmand the following year, although 
officials present during the operation suggest the Taliban’s operation was staged.159 
Similarly, the Taliban’s small-scale eradication efforts in three districts in Kandahar 
resulted in the destruction of 325 hectares cultivated with poppy, a drop in the bucket for 
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a region that contained 5,602 hectares dedicated to poppy cultivation that year.160 These 
measures constitute what Alain Labrousse calls the Taliban’s counternarcotics “pseudo 
campaign;” political theater staged for the benefit of potential international donors and 
the UN while impacting the opium industry very little.161  
D. THE TALIBAN’S OPIUM PROHIBITION: JULY 2000–OCTOBER 2001 
On July 27, Mullah Mohammad Omar issued a fatwa outlawing the cultivation of 
opium poppy. On the surface, the 2000 prohibition seems to support some aspects of the 
assumption that the Taliban ended drug production based on Islamic principles. There 
were several previous bans on opium cultivation, but without the religious endorsement 
in Omar’s July fatwa.162 However, the prohibition is often widely misinterpreted and 
distorted; UN officials at the time even called it “one of the most remarkable successes 
ever,” despite the fact that the ban systematically destroyed the rural economy; 
significantly impacting millions of Afghans by increasing poverty rates and 
indebtedness.163  
If the Taliban government actively encouraged the cultivation of poppy, what can 
explain Mullah Omar’s decision to prohibit the cultivation of poppy in the summer of 
2000, two months after most farmers already received advance loans to cover their winter 
living expenditures in exchange for a fixed quota of opium production, a traditional 
Afghan micro-loan system known as salaam? Farrell and Thorne’s seminal report on the 
Taliban’s opium ban posits three key factors influenced Omar’s decision.164 First, the 
UNDCP were able to “establish trust and influence with the Taliban” following a high 
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profile meeting between both sides in March 1999. Second, the UNDCP was able to 
leverage the Taliban’s fundamentalist approach to drug-control by playing upon its 
religious rigidity. Lastly, the UNDCP exploited the wounded ego of Mullah Omar whose 
pledge in September 1999 to reduce opium output by one-third went ignored by most 
Afghans. Although Farrell and Thorne’s approach is commendable, their arguments fail 
to consider the broader economic conditions facing Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 
Taliban’s biggest patron at the time. A more complete explanation can be achieved by 
examining the economic conditions facing the Taliban government and its main 
benefactors at the time.  
Beginning in 1998, financial aid to the Taliban began to dry up from two of its 
primary sources: donations from the Arab Gulf and from the Government of Pakistan. 
After Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, the international community 
imposed severe economic sanctions against Pakistan, which seriously impacted its 
economy. Following the August 1998 twin-bombings of the U.S. embassies in eastern 
Africa and the Taliban’s refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden from Kandahar, the Saudi 
government cracked down on funding flowing to the Taliban from within its borders, 
although the measures failed to curb the money flowing out of Dubai.  
According to recently declassified U.S. documents, the Taliban faced an acute 
financial shortage in 1999. The report paints a picture of disgruntled unpaid Taliban 
commanders who found it difficult to procure small arms ammunition, rockets, and the 
batteries used for their wireless communication radios.165 Some Taliban commanders, 
distraught over the lack of income, defected to Jamiat-Islami (part of the Northern 
Alliance) in northern Baghlan and Kunduz provinces, the front line between the Taliban 
and Massoud’s opposition forces at the time. The economic relationship between 
Pakistan and the Taliban remained markedly different in 1999 compared to past years. In 
1998, Pakistan’s Coordination Committee, a secret entity tasked with maintaining the 
Taliban’s war effort, provided a payment of $6 million over a six-month period beginning 
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in July.166 By February 1999, Pakistan’s Coordination Committee paid less than a million 
dollars to the Taliban every few months; the sanctions against Pakistan in 1998 were 
blamed for the decrease in payments.167  
On July 6, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 13129 imposing a 
ban on economic transactions between the Taliban and the American government. The 
decrease in aid from Pakistan along with the U.S. embargo and the constant state of war 
strained the Taliban government considerably. By April 2000, the Taliban was forced to 
issue a 40% cut in staff, leaving only 130,000 personnel with official government 
positions.168 Despite a short exodus of aid workers in 1998, the Taliban government had 
become dependent on the support offered by NGOs whether they wanted to or not. In 
1998, NGOs were responsible for spending $113 million in Afghanistan and provided 
enough work for approximately 25,000 Afghans.169 By September 2000, nearly 70% of 
Afghans were unemployed, but given the 350 man-days that would have been required to 
harvest the 91,000 hectares of poppy cultivated in 1999, opium may have provided half 
of Afghanistan’s employment between 1999 and 2000.170 
In contrast to the inconsistent funding from the Gulf and Pakistan, the Taliban 
was making between $25 and $75 million just on the ushr and zakat collected from 
opium poppy farmers and traffickers in 1999, although these remain approximate 
estimates. It is reasonable to believe the Taliban’s opium ban does not solely derive from 
short-term economic motivations, but it cannot be completely discounted. The Taliban 
faced a growing crisis as state infrastructure remained mostly destroyed and development 
projects ceased by 2000. Afghanistan’s drought experienced in 2000 made the prohibition 
of opium even more difficult for Afghan farmers to cope with as licit crops like wheat 
and vegetables consume twice the amount of water needed the much more weather-
resistant papaver somniferum (opium poppy) does; not to mention the meager profits 
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turned with licit crops versus opium. As Brown suggests, the Taliban was “balancing its 
domestic popular legitimacy with its international legitimacy as well as its political gains 
from the illicit economy with its financial profits.”171  
E. CONCLUSION 
Rising from the ashes of a devastating two-year civil war, the advent of the 
puritanical Islamist Taliban movement in 1994 and its subsequent domination of the 
country between 1996 and 2001, initially led many international actors to believe 
Afghanistan’s narcotics conundrum would end swiftly given the Taliban’s rigid and 
draconian interpretation of Shari’ah (Islamic Law). Soon after the Taliban seized Kabul 
in 1996, Giovanni Qauglia, the United Nation’s Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 
director for Pakistan, declared, “in these circumstances, the [drug] problem [in 
Afghanistan] can be dealt with in ten years.”172 In reality, the Taliban did little to 
discourage poppy cultivation until the summer of 2000 when the Taliban’s Supreme 
Leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund, deemed poppy cultivation “un-Islamic” and 
implemented a nationwide ban, prompting UN officials at the time to label the ban “one 
of the most remarkable successes ever.”173  
Given the post war-context, conflict-economics and poverty, not Islamism or 
government type, needs to be further contextualized. The harvesting of poppies increased 
substantially during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the destruction of its licit 
agrarian economy first mutated Afghanistan’s society into a war economy, then a 
narcotics economy. Following the end of international support and to the resistance 
movements in 1992 and the subsequent civil war, poppy cultivation and opium 
production funded all sides of the conflict and provided a livelihood to more than half of 
the devastated nation long abandoned by the international community.  
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Given the post-occupation circumstances, opium fulfilled a critical financial need 
for a majority of Afghans, especially following the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of 
the central government in 1992. Adam Pain has suggested that opium has served as the 
best “cash transfer” in Afghanistan, doing more to “reduce income poverty and assure 
food security than anything else on offer.”174 This continues to be an accurate 
assessment. As late as 2007, farmers in eastern Nangarhar province sold off personal 
possessions, gold, opium stocks, and in some cases, their young daughters, just to 
maintain a livelihood throughout the winter months. Current counternarcotics programs, 
such as forced eradication programs, have caused further instability and increased 
poverty levels among rural farmers. Alternative livelihood programs, as well as crop 
substitution schemes and international assistance, has been poorly implemented and 
negligibly managed, creating the same sort of vacuum that forces poor and starving 
communities to grow poppy in the first place. Lastly, the current insecure climate and 
political instability has led to a far more serious problem than just insurgent and anti-
government factions participating and supporting the narcotics industry.  
Arguably, government complicity and corruption may be the most damaging 
aspect of the narcotics penetration of Afghan society. As this report intended to examine, 
the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001 inherited and accepted the narcotics 
industry despite the conflict of interest with the movement’s deeply religious principles. 
The Taliban can be faulted for encouraging and facilitating the industry for five years 
before inhumanely destroying the nation’s economy; damage from which the country has 
yet to recover. In essence, the Taliban-era government is no different from the current 
regime that is equally as engaged in the drug industry. The narcotics industry’s tentacles 
reach deep into the central government, including the Interior Ministry whose task is to 
help curb the drug problem, as well as the President’s own inner-circle, his own brother 
accused of providing political protection to various trafficking networks. Opium 
production has caused “the rise of a ‘shadow state,’ where the distinction between using 
official position for the public good and private gain merges,” a description that easily 
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describes the Taliban-era government as well.175 Much like the insurgency and the role 
of its actors in the drug industry, the government’s own involvement is simply a resource 
that has been opportunistically used.  
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V.  POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN: EMERGENCE OF A 
NARCO-STATE 2001–2010  
On October 7, 2001, the United States led a massive aerial attack against 
Afghanistan and the Taliban military regime. By late December, the Taliban conceded its 
last stronghold in southern Afghanistan and “strategically retreated” to various safe-
havens in neighboring Pakistan to reconstitute and prepare to launch a protracted guerilla 
warfare campaign against the newly emplaced Afghan interim government and its 
international allies. Analysts at the time did not readily understand that the October attack 
coincided with Afghanistan’s traditional opium poppy planting season, which begins in 
late September and ends in mid-October. October also marked the tail end of the 
Taliban’s economically disastrous 14-month opium ban, a social experiment that left 
thousands of rural farmers and their families deeply in debt. Protracted drought 
conditions exasperated the situation and made it even more challenging for farmers to 
switch from a drought-resistance cash crop like poppy to alternative water-reliant food 
crops like wheat. 
Whether reports of the Taliban rescinding the opium ban three weeks prior to the 
U.S. led attack in 2001 are accurate or not, Afghan farmers desperate to repay their 
financial debts and survive throughout the winter once again planted opium throughout 
the poppy belt in southern and eastern Afghanistan resulting in a bumper crop during the 
spring harvest in 2002 with an estimated 3,400 tons of opium produced. The U.S. military 
force in Afghanistan made it clear early on, that interdiction and eradication were not 
essential parts of U.S. military plans for Afghanistan; a military spokesmen commented 
in 2002, “we’re not a drug task force. That’s not part of our mission.”176 
Following the Taliban’s ouster, the drug industry rebounded immediately, but in 
2006, Afghanistan’s burgeoning drug industry reached unprecedented new heights when 
over 8,200 metric tons of opium was produced; breaking international records. This 
chapter examines various explanatory factors that led to the resurgence and subsequent 
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strengthening of the narcotics industry and identifies the types of participation and 
exploitation of the drug trade by various actors, namely the Taliban, but compares the 
Taliban’s participation against criminal syndicates/consortia, warlord organizations, and 
the state-level power holders. This period marks an interesting transition for the Taliban, 
namely because of its reversion from a state-actor to a hybrid-revolutionary movement-
cum-criminal consortium. The following analysis will examine how the Taliban 
reemerged alongside a burgeoning narcotics industry, the failure of the international 
community to curb both narcotics production and Taliban expansion, and how each 
organization participates and benefits from the narcotics trade while providing an 
overview of Afghanistan’s contemporary narco-political economy. 
A. 2002–2007: RESURGENT NARCOTICS INDUSTRY 
In January 2002, the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) announced that opium 
production was illegal and unIslamic, and therefore, reissued the prohibition of opium 
poppy cultivation.177 Under the same legislation, the AIA also prohibited the processing, 
trafficking and consumption of opium and its variants; although enforcing the edict 
became almost impossible as the new government lacked the capabilities to project its 
power outside Afghanistan’s few major population centers.178 The processing of opium 
into morphine base and refined heroin became apparent almost immediately, and 
traditional drug processing sites in eastern Afghanistan were producing up to $600,000 
worth of heroin a week, or 70–100 kilograms a week.179 The increase in production 
coincided with the British government’s $30 million counter-narcotics strategy for 
Afghanistan, which financially led the international community’s anti-drug effort in 
Afghanistan at the time. The British-led eradication program helped destroy 16,500 
hectares of poppy fields, out of an estimated 80,000ha planted for the 2002 harvest.180 
Additionally, international efforts did little to curb the rising influence of powerful narco-
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connected warlords and commanders, in fact, U.S. policy even strengthened some of 
these personalities to help engage in counter-terrorism missions aimed at eliminating 
high-value al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.181 
Afghanistan soon found itself on a precipice, facing a multitude of challenges and 
obstacles to achieving acceptable levels of political and social stability and security. As 
Shaw notes, Afghanistan faced “the challenge of whether legitimate state formation and 
economic growth [would] be subverted by the expansion and consolidation of the illicit 
economy.”182 Rubin also came to a similar conclusion during the final year of the Taliban 
rule of Afghanistan:  
Ending war in Afghanistan might transform the criminalized war economy 
into an even faster-expanding criminalized peace economy. Whoever rules 
Afghanistan, the incentives for misgovernment are nearly irresistible.183 
In short, several overlapping factors helped facilitate the resurgence in Afghan 
narcotics production between 2002 and 2005: economic, environmental, political, 
physical (infrastructure) and the presence of an entrenched illicit market structure built 
over the past 20 years, which became enhanced by the criminalization of Afghanistan’s 
long-time war economy.  
Several environmental factors contributed to the reliance on poppy production 
beginning in 1998, namely a severe drought. The devastating drought, sometimes referred 
locally as “Mullah Omar’s drought,” ravaged Afghanistan’s agricultural sector between 
1998 and 2005 causing many legal crops like wheat and fruits to fail while weather 
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resistant cash crops like poppy became a more feasible choice for desperate farmers.184 
Eventually, poppy cultivation and opium itself became a necessary precondition for the 
rural economies to function. U.S. counter-insurgency specialists advised against the 
militarily imposing forced eradication measures as these measures would undoubtedly 
force farmers and families to oppose the government and that the Taliban would exploit 
these grievances. Despite international military reservations, the U.S. DEA, U.S. State 
Department and the British government “tried to influence the AIA into conducting 
eradication measures.”185 
The small number of U.S. and allied international forces in Afghanistan took a 
laissez-faire approach and even released a number of high value drug traffickers known 
to law enforcement authorities because at the time the U.S. Defense Department “didn’t 
do counter-narcotics.”186 For instance, as author James Risen notes, the U.S. military’s 
policy in Afghanistan states that if American soldiers discover illegal drugs they “could” 
destroy them, which is “very different from issuing firm rules stating that U.S. forces 
must destroy any drugs discovered.”187 In 2006, Lt. General Eikenberry, then commander 
all U.S. forces in Afghanistan, made it clear that “drugs were not a priority of the U.S. 
military in Afghanistan,” a strategic decision that prompted General Freakley, then 
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D.E.A. and Afghan counter-narcotics police in Nangarhar Province, one of three key 
heroin processing location in the country.188 General Freakley specified that antidrug 
operations were “an unnecessary obstacle to his military operations.”  
In addition to the inconsistencies with U.S. and international policy regarding 
Afghanistan’s narcotics industry, internal socio-economic factors, such as extreme 
poverty, the lack of available agricultural experts and technicians, the massive flow of 
refugees returning back to Afghanistan, and the faltering capacity of Afghanistan’s law 
enforcement infrastructure further fueled the growth of the narcotics industry. Physical 
deficiencies like the inadequate number of functioning irrigation systems and 
transportation infrastructure, a lack of agricultural technology, such as improved seed 
varieties and fertilizers, also helped facilitate Afghanistan’s rural economy to depend on 
poppy farming. No access to reliable and socially acceptable micro-credit programs and a 
reliance on imported goods rather than domestically produced products reinforced the 
opium-trader dominated finance industry; leaving many rural farmers with little options 
but to grow opium in exchange for advanced payments, known as the salaam system, one 
of the only means available for farmers and their families to survive the winter.  
The Taliban movement, exiled and headquartered in southwestern Pakistan 
(Quetta) since 2002, reestablished links with criminal syndicates, smuggling networks, 
drug traffickers, and foreign inoculators in the Arab Gulf is search of financial assistance 
and sustainability.189 The Taliban was at odds with its former Al Qaeda allies who had 
moved on to support Arab terrorist networks engaged in warfare against U.S. forces in 
Iraq starting in 2003. At the time, Al Qaeda commanders and financiers viewed the 
Taliban as ineffective and unreliable following its quick defeat in late 2001 and failure to 
jumpstart and effective insurgency since then. These misgivings would soon turn back 
into acceptance as the Taliban reemerged under the new military leadership of former 
Taliban war veterans Mullah Dadullah Lang [“lame-legged”], a notorious battlefield 
commander infamous for his brutality, and Jalaluddin Haqqani, a well respected 
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mujahideen commander who maintained relations with senior Taliban leadership, al 
Qaeda, the Pakistani intelligence services, and who could attract foreign fighters from all 
over the world.  
Dadullah initially campaigned hard for the Taliban between 2002 and 2004, 
traveling throughout Pakistan seeking financial donations and conducting recruitment 
drives from Karachi to Quetta. His main area of focus was southern Afghanistan where 
upwards of 50% of all Afghan opium was produced. Before long, commanders like 
Dadullah engaged the narcotics industry and exploited gaps and weaknesses in the 
international community’s counter-narcotics strategy of forced eradication of farmers’ 
opium crops by destabilizing local communities to the point local officials could no 
longer serve in the districts.190 In what was later deemed one of the most successful 
“hearts and minds” campaigns of the conflict, Mullah Dadullah vowed to protect any 
farmer and his livelihood from the forced eradication campaign supported by the 
international community and enforced by local government poppy-eradication teams.191 
As Brown notes with earlier Taliban participation in the narcotics trade, “involvement 
with the illicit narcotics industry boosted the Taliban’s legitimacy because it provided a 
reliable source of livelihood to a vast segment of the population.”192 However, despite 
such “valiant” efforts by commanders like Mullah Dadullah, little profit—if any at all—
derived from the narco-trade was reinvested in local communities for public services or 
infrastructure development, an interesting gap in the Taliban movement’s military 
strategy, which initially sought public support and sympathy.  
The Taliban nurtured the narcotics industry between 2002 and 2006 largely 
because of strategic operational concerns; and operated in conjunction with narco-
trafficking groups at the tactical land operation level but rarely at the strategic level. First, 
the Taliban sought to regain economic capabilities by any means necessary; criminal 
enterprise, including protecting the drug trade and kidnapping for ransom, became a 
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viable and acceptable option for short-term income. Second, the political capital gained in 
southern Afghanistan by extending a “helping hand” to farmers who were perceived to be 
oppressed by an aggressive and belligerent interim government became a key pillar in the 
Taliban’s strategy to penetrate the rural countryside in search of safe havens and public 
support, although this thinly veiled strategy failed to capitalize fully on the government’s 
lagging effort to restore law and order, stability, development and economic prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the increase in public support for the insurgency allowed the Taliban a 
large degree of operational freedom, including an enhanced intelligence and support 
network throughout the rural environs, a level of mutual trust between narco-criminal 
groups and the insurgents, and the establishment of sanctuaries located inside of 
Afghanistan, mostly in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan 
and Zabul.  
However, the Taliban was not the only armed polity to participate in the narcotics 
industry. Hezb-i-Islami played a historical and integral role in the cultivation poppy and 
the refinement of opium into both morphine base and heroin during the 1980s, 1990s, and 
in the contemporary conflict.193 Not satisfied with selling raw opium in the markets, 
Hezb controlled at least six-heroin refinement laboratories in Kho-i-Sultan in 
southwestern Pakistan that refined opium obtained from Helmand province.194 Hezb 
military leadership also orchestrated the assassination of Nasim Akhundzada in 1990, the 
undisputed “king of heroin” in Helmand province, whose death kicked off a new round of 
narco-wars that consumed Helmand province between 1990 and 1993.195 Following 
Hekmatyar’s clandestine return to Afghanistan from his exile in Iran in 2002, his Hezb-i-
Islami faction reportedly controlled most of the drug business in northern Badakhshan  
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province, one of the most important hubs in processing/refining opium into morphine and 
for trafficking into Central Asia along the “northern route,” which feeds Europe and 
Russia with some 70 tons of heroin each year.196  
Criminal syndicates, warlords and their militias, and influential powerbrokers 
became increasingly involved in the narcotics industry over time, a trend that would later 
facilitate the emergence of criminalized politicians during the formation of the Afghan 
Interim Administration and lead to a consolidation of market brokers by 2005–06. Many 
of the new Afghan Interim Administration’s new powerbrokers also doubled as district 
level traders, zonal or main market traders, who had the social and political clout, as well 
as monetary wealth to maintain a healthy war chest to pay militiamen and buy off 
political loyalties. At the time, the AIA leadership, including interim President Hamid 
Karzai, chose these powerful figures to help exert power and control over local fiefdoms 
on behalf of the emerging central government. Some farmers in Helmand Province even 
suggested that President Karzai solicited their help in toppling the Taliban regime by 
promising to let them cultivate poppy in exchange, a claim the Afghan government has 
since vehemently denied.197 Under-resourced and under-manned U.S. military units were 
all too eager to support those figures whose power included scores of armed militiamen 
and vehicles. Between U.S. and Afghan support, warlord figures, such as Hazrat Ali, 
Sher Muhammad Ahkundzada, Abdul Rahman Jan Noorzai, Jan Mohammad Popalzai, 
Gul Agha Sherzai, Mullah Naqibullah Akhund, Haji Agha La Lai Dastagiri, Col. Abdul 
Razziq Achekzai, Mohammad “Khano” Khan, and Amir Dad “Dado” Khan, became 
empowered and reasserted their political and economic stranglehold over the key opium 
producing regions in Helmand, Nangarhar and Kandahar Provinces.  
B. HOW THE NARCOTICS INDUSTRY BENEFITS THE STATE AND 
INSURGENCY  
Understanding how and who participates in the Afghan narcotics industry has 
received varying levels of attention since 2001, with most analytical reporting focusing 
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on how the Taliban participate and benefit from the narcotics trade.198 It is important to 
include not only armed resistance movements like the Taliban into this analysis, but also 
include state power brokers and influential non-state actors like businessmen, criminal 
kingpins, and former resistance commanders who participate and benefit from the drug 
trade. As Williams notes, “such dark networks,” particularly the “state-smuggler 
relationship, is a paradoxical one, defined by irony and contradiction. The smuggler is 
pursued by the state but at the same time is kept in business by the state…State laws 
provide the very opening for (and high profitability of) smuggling in the first place.”199 
The following analysis describes how each armed polity engages in various levels of the 
drug industry and where they fit into the overall value chain of the narcotics industry.  
1. Tier 1 Participation  
a. Taxation 
Taxation, along with organizational acceptance of the narcotics industry, 
represents the most passive forms of participation in the drug industry. Taxation is a 
critical strategy in leeching economic gain from impoverished communities that rely on 
narcotics production, a trend not unique to Afghanistan but one found readily throughout 
conflict zones where narcotics are also produced.200 Similarly, Islamist movements, such 
as the Taliban, reframe religious rhetoric, such as zakaat, an Islamic form of voluntary 
donation, to reap profit from the drug industry. Like zakaat, ushr is a traditional Islamic 
agricultural tax that has been transformed to be applicable to illicit agricultural 
commodities, such as opium and cannabis resin. The Taliban in recent years have applied 
ushr between 10 and 20% on farmers, processors, traders and traffickers. Increasingly,  
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where the drug trade or the trafficking of drugs is not as pronounced but where insurgents 
groups like Hezb-i-Islami and the Taliban are active, licit industries and licit agriculture 
are being taxed; sometimes heavily.  
b. Money Laundering  
The laundering of money or income generated through any type of 
participation in the drug trade in Afghanistan marks the second most accepted form of 
passive involvement in the drug trade; but probably the most important element that links 
licit and illicit transactions together. Afghanistan’s drug profits are primarily laundered 
through trade, the complex hawala remittance system, or through simply bartering 
narcotics for other commodities or services.201 Although the hawala markets in 
Afghanistan are an extremely difficult entity to research, field research conducted 
between March and July 2005 reveal staggering patterns of narco-profit laundering. As 
Thompson observed: 
Kandahari hawaladars explained that there are some months when shops 
receive very little money from the drug business. This is the case, for 
example, during the months of February, March, and April when opium 
poppy is at the growing stage. On the other hand, during the poppy 
cultivation months (from October to December) the hawala market 
experiences a huge influx of funds reflecting advance payments to farmers 
for crop cultivation. The market also experiences large fluctuations from 
the end of April, to June because the opium is ready for purchase. The 
hawaladars therefore reported figures of the highest order during the two 
phases of opium poppy cultivation and harvesting.202 
The hawala system continues to maintain its position as a primary choice 
for Afghans transferring and receiving cash payments, exchanging currency, and 
remittances in the country. Mansfield and Goodhand posit the Hawaladar provide an 
essential service for all parties involved; serving as links between official banks, aid 
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agencies, warlords and smugglers.203 Centralized banking systems slowly emerged in 
Afghanistan throughout the decade, but high-profile cases of corruption and abuse, such 
as the Da Afghanistan Bank (Kabul Bank) scandal in 2010, eroded Afghanistan’s public 
confidence and belief in such modern systems.204  
Raw opium, or in some cases, even better quality refined morphine base 
(dry opium), is used as currency among rural farmers and traders, which has led to the 
proliferation of opium-based currency economies emerging in rural areas, with poor 
farmers and interment workers bartering small measurements of opium for commodities 
like sugar, tea, and other food staples.205  
In 2006, field research revealed farmers and small traders in Helmand 
retained small stocks (2–10 kgs) of opium as reserves that were slowly traded throughout 
the year according to need; farmers selling their opium immediately concluding the 
harvest were far more common.206 It is interesting to note that among all groups 
participating in the narcotics industry in Afghanistan, very few, if any, have reinvested 
their laundered profits to improve public services or infrastructure, such as water, supply, 
sewage and transportation.207 Higher grades of refined morphine base like heroin no. 3 is 
also used, although this higher end commodity is usually bartered for weapons, 
ammunition and explosives, which constitutes a more severe form of participation in the 
narcotics trade (tier-two) and is discussed in detail below.  
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2. Tier 2 Participation 
a. Protection 
Protection of the narcotics industry, such as armed escorts for drug 
convoys or fixed perimeter security on drug processing workshops, lies at the intersection 
of those just “taking a cut” and those who fully participate in the drug industry.  
For example, drug traffickers in southern Afghanistan are known to 
provide the Taliban with motorcycles, cellular phones, SIM cards, weapons and 
explosives in exchange for protection of their processing workshops, refinement labs, 
opium markets, and trafficking routes.208 For instance, according to the U.S. Department 
of Treasury, the network of Haji Agha Jan Alizai, a major drug trafficker based in 
Helmand province, provided shelter and transportation to Taliban fighters in exchange for 
the Taliban providing security for the narco-traffickers and their storage sites.209 
Similarly, the network of Saleh Mohammad Kakar, a major drug trafficker active in 
Helmand and Kandahar, provided the Taliban with vehicles for use in suicide attacks 
from a car dealership he owned in exchange for Taliban protection of his heroin-
processing facilities in the notorious Band-e-Timor area of western Kandahar.  
In what has become a move toward motivational convergence at the foot-
soldier level, Taliban operatives began issuing death threats against farmers who adhered 
to the government prohibition of poppy cultivation, namely in parts of Helmand 
Province.210 However, these dynamics may be restricted to the “poppy-belt” of southern 
Afghanistan where the Taliban is most robust. It should be noted that some traffickers 
and trafficking organizations are known to pay independent armed groups not affiliated 
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with the Taliban to protect their convoys. Haji Juma Khan for instance, reportedly 
retained a 1,500-man security contingent to protect his narcotics shipments throughout 
southwestern Afghanistan and Iran.211 Similarly, trafficking syndicates in the Helmand-
Pakistan wasteland of Baram Cha were known to protect their clandestine drug 
processing facilities with both Taliban fighters and independently armed groups, some of 
which were capable of procuring and deploying heavy anti-aircraft batteries and anti-
helicopter “steel nets” to defend against Coalition and Afghan-led military raids.212  
b. In-House Capabilities 
In some cases, beginning at least in 2007, the Taliban reportedly moved 
into processing itself in areas under its control, namely in Helmand province; in other 
words, the Taliban acquired “in-house” drug processing capabilities. The Taliban seized 
the key opium producing district of Musa Qala (Helmand) in February 2007 and held it 
for 10 months before a massive military offensive involving thousands of international 
troops, dubbed Operation Snakebite, evicted the Taliban from its opium-encampment. 
Following the conclusion of the operation, officials claimed to have destroyed up to 300 
opium refinement workshops and confiscated over 11 tons of opium from the abandoned 
Taliban district administration building.213  
Around the same time, Christina Oguz, the head of the UNODC, claimed 
in 2008 that the Taliban became involved in trafficking and manufacturing of heroin in 
Helmand province.214 Local Taliban leaders owned and operated at least 60 opium 
refinement workshops throughout areas under their control in Helmand at the time.215 
Highly touted as a major victory in 2008, Musa Qala has slipped back into narco-initiated 
instability and Taliban initiated violence, which prompted an influx of U.S. forces into 
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the district during the summer of 2010. The Taliban has launched at least seven 
assassination attempts against Mullah Abdul Salaam, the post-Operation Snakebite 
governor of Musa Qala and former Taliban commander, and even recaptured Salaam’s 
home village and key opium producing hamlet of Shah Karez in March 2010.216 These 
operations show not only tactical unity between insurgents and criminals, but strategic 
coordination that threatens to undermine the writ of the Afghan state. 
Similarly, anecdotal evidence exists that the seasonal labor needed to 
harvest the opium from the ripened poppy plants, many of whom are from outside the 
areas where they migrate to during the harvest, tend to stick around following the two to 
three week harvesting period and engage in subversive activities for an enticing wage. 
These Taliban, referred to widely in the press as “$10-Taliban,” named after the daily 
wage received for aiding the full time Taliban fighters, make a considerable amount of 
money for a minimal amount of work; especially considering that Afghan security forces, 
such as the police, rarely make more than $75 per month. These “blue-collar” Taliban can 
make up to $300 or more for helping plant a deadly roadside bomb and landmine; the 
tactic most preferred by the Taliban and the number one killer of U.S. and NATO forces 
in Afghanistan. Although it is impossible to gauge how many of the seasonal laborers 
partake in guerrilla activities following the harvest, the Taliban does make an effort to tap 
these networks of “men who have worked together and [became] familiar with the local 
area.”217 
c.  Drugs for Weapons  
Substantial evidence also exists linking the Taliban to drugs for weapons 
barter schemes with various black market arms dealers including its former enemies from 
the Northern Alliance. Taliban intermediaries are also known to travel as far as Kunduz 
and Badakhshan in northern Afghanistan, where they smuggle high grade Helmand 
opium or heroin (transited through Helmand’s Kajaki district on its way north) over the 
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border into Tajikistan where it is exchanged (not sold) for AK-47’s, RPG rounds, and 
7.62X39 ammo boxes.218 Russian organized crime groups allegedly run weapons bazaars 
located near the porous and ineffectively guarded Tajik-Afghan border.219 The weapons 
are smuggled back over the border in a similar fashion where the market price jumps 
from $150 an AK-47 to nearly $400 by the time it reaches fighters in Helmand. Most 
smugglers prefer to receive refined heroin for weapons, with a kilogram of heroin able to 
fetch between 10 and 15 AK-47s, or between four and five Kalakov AK-74’s.  
A popular border crossing point is Badakhshan is Ishkashem, which 
allows smugglers a smooth transit to weapons and drug markets in Tajikistan.220 
Helmandi Taliban facilitators are known to also purchase weapons from intermediaries in 
Takhar and Kunduz provinces, some of whom are former “Northern Alliance” rivals.221 
Additionally, Western officials believe up to 70% of all weapons smuggled into 
Afghanistan enter via roadways, implicating both rampant corruption and the Afghan-
Transit-Trade agreement as creating the conditions needed for the massive influx of 
weapons being used against Coalition and Afghan forces.  
d.  Political Protection and Internal Trafficking  
The role of protecting drug convoys is not only restricted to outsourced 
insurgent militias. Mid-level positions within the Afghan highway police are routinely 
auctioned off for $25,000. Bribes and extortion generate ten times that amount in areas 
situated along smuggling and trafficking routes. Government issued police vehicles, such 
as the typical Ford Ranger pickup truck, often become dual usage for protection and 
trafficking purposes. A senior Afghan police official spoke about the endemic corruption 
                                                 
218 Jerome Starkey, “Drug for Guns: How the Afghan Heroin Trade is Fueling the Taliban Insurgency, 
the Independent (April 29, 2008).  
219 Dan McDougal, “Moscow Drug Mules,” Mail Online, November 7, 2008.  
220 Tom Blackwell, “Afghans Target Drug Trade to Choke Out Insurgents,” The National Post, 
November 6, 2008. Note: Ishkashem is a district in Badakhshan province and location of the “joint bazaar,” 
a 2,000 square meter market area where weapons, ammunition, and narcotics are sold clandestinely.  
221 The “Northern Alliance,” which covertly supplied with weapons and ammunition by Russia, Iran 
and India during the Taliban era, allegedly also sold excess arms and ammunition to the Taliban during that 
time period as well. Gregory Salmon, Poppy: Life, Death, and Addiction Inside Afghanistan’s Opium Trade 
(Sydney, Australia: Ebury Press, 2009), 320–321. 
 84
among the highway police in 2006, saying, “he [an Afghan police official] has a police 
issue vehicle, so he can take his smuggling everywhere he wants because he has the 
uniform…He can do it and nobody is there to stop him.”222 A low-level Taliban leader 
offered a similar explanation, saying:  
Our 400 families collect 100,000 Pakistani Rupees ($1,250) each. This 
forty million ($500,000) goes to the district governor, the district police 
chief—the people in charge. They are protecting these fields. They are 
encouraging the farmers to grow because they are getting a lot of money 
out of the deal. That is the process.223 
Similar accounts have been documented regarding the Afghan Border 
Police in southern Afghanistan, particularly the Spin Boldak-Pakistan border crossing 
point. Abdur Razziq, Kandahar’s Provincial Border Police General, who is commonly 
referred to as the “Godfather,” has been implicated as the overlord of a multi-million 
dollar hashish trafficking operation. When acting on tip provided by a rival Afghan 
politician, British, American and Afghan counter-narcotics commandos raided a major 
hashish weigh station in the Spin Boldak district, seizing an estimated 240 metric tons of 
drying hashish; the world record for the most illicit drugs every confiscated.224 A follow-
up operation four months later seized an additional 40 metric tons of hashish at a 
compound also located in Spin Boldak. Eventually, Canadian and U.S. military officials 
arrested a senior Afghan Border Police commander from the neighboring Reg district of 
Kandahar on charges of running a cross-border drug trafficking syndicate. As noted 
above, many powerful and highly placed government officials have been repeatedly 
accused on engaging the narcotics industry in public reporting, raising the question of 
how deeply the narcotics industry has penetrated the state and if Afghanistan represents a 
“Narco-state?”  
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3. Tier 3 Participation  
The type of armed polity most easily assigned tier-three participation in the 
Afghan narcotics industry is criminal syndicates and consortia. Typically, these groups 
are locally run organized crime families with buy-in among local power brokers (formal 
and informal) and have established ties with licit businesses to not only help launder drug 
profits, but to also facilitate the movement of refined narcotics domestically and to the 
border frontiers and beyond. Additionally, portions of warlord organizations, which 
manifested into state power brokers after 2002, especially among border security forces 
and officials, compromise important portions of the tier-three participants. For example, 
President Hamid Karzai appointed 13 former commanders with ties to the drug trade as 
senior police commanders in mid-2006―each name was a late addition to a list of 86 
police chiefs selected by U.S., NATO and Afghan officials as part of a 
professionalization effort to enhance the reliability of the Afghan National Police 
force.225 
Some reports properly describe the tier operating in conjunction with corrupt 
officials as having “effectively filled the void vacated by the 'legalized warlords'. This 
elite group of wealthy businessmen is largely anonymous, quietly using high-level 
political connections to safeguard its interests. The group knows exactly who to pay to 
allow the safe inward passage of the precursor chemicals required to refine opium into 
heroin, and also control the outward flow of the drug to exports markets. Prior to the 
Taliban, such a role was played by a multitude of competing interests and players, many 
of whom were prone to launching bitter turf wars over their trade.226 
Several examples of such illicit enterprises and their respective kingpins in the 
contemporary context include the Haji Bashir Noorzai Organization, the Haji Baaz 
Mohammad Organization, the Haji Juma Khan network, the syndicate in eastern 
Afghanistan led by Haji Bajcho, and the southern networks of Haji Agha Jan Alizai and 
Saleh Mohammad Kakar.  
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Haji Juma Khan ran one of Afghanistan’s most lucrative drug trafficking 
operations and maintained close economic ties to the Taliban leadership, although his 
primary concerns remained his own personal wealth, economic power and his efficient 
industrial-scale drug production capabilities. Haji Bashir Noorzai, a tribal leader from 
southern Kandahar who helped support the early iteration of the Taliban movement in 
1994 and owned the mosque where the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Omar 
preached, led the largest drug trafficking organization in southern Afghanistan before his 
arrest in 2005. In a February 2004 statement to the House Committee on International 
Relations, Congressman Mark Kirk proclaimed Bashir Noorzai’s organization trafficked 
2,000 kilograms of heroin from Kandahar to Pakistan every eight weeks.227 Haji Baaz 
Mohammad had suspected links to both Haji Bashir Noorzai’s organization and anti-
government entities, although his own network held its sway over eastern Afghanistan, 
not Bashir’s area of influence in Kandahar. Baaz Mohammad is the first Afghan drug 
kingpins extradited to the United States for heroin trafficking charges; and his associate; 
Mohammad Essa, was arrested and extradited to the United States in 2007 for conspiring 
to traffic $25 million worth of heroin to the West.  
In all four examples, these networks not only had connections to the farm-gate 
production of opium, but also led refinement facilities, procured and trafficked the 
necessary precursor chemicals needed for refinement purposes, and trafficked narcotics 
to the borders with Pakistan and Iran where the drugs were further transported abroad 
through international mafia connections and corrupt officials. These four personalities 
posses all tier-three criteria, and although tied to the insurgency and the Taliban in 
varying degrees, they did not adhere to a strict ideological doctrine other than predatory 
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VI.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The opium problem can only be resolved at the production level. But that 
presupposes a considerably enlarged police force and, still more 
important, the provision of alternative means of subsidence for the poppy 
growers. We can’t possibly shoulder the burden ourselves. A programme 
of this nature involving development schemes would call for international 
aid on a massive scale. Up till now, however, all the United Nations have 
done is sent us experts. But that doesn’t solve the peasants’ problems. 
After all, they can’t very well eat an expert. 
—Colonel Katawazi, Kabul Police Chief, circa 1971.228  
Sadly, an Afghan security official could have easily made the above quote in 
2010, which was spoken nearly 40 years ago. Afghanistan continues to face a period of 
protracted social and political instability where the entrenched narcotics trade plays a 
substantial role. Enduring conflict, ineffective governance and widespread corruption 
have only compounded the problem, nearly all of which is directly fueled by the narcotics 
trade. Despite a nearly ten-year military engagement by the United States and the 
international community under NATO auspices, counternarcotics efforts have failed to 
wean Afghanistan from its addiction to the production of and trafficking of illicit 
narcotics.  
Like in Colombia, Afghanistan’s legacy of conflict “and the resources available 
through drug production enabled these groups to establish themselves as independent 
political actors who could sit down and negotiate with the state and make formal political 
demands.”229 The problem of illicit drug production in Afghanistan is not only a 
reflection of a failed state, but the degree in which the state enables the production of 
these narcotics is symptomatic of how the state engages and operates in conjunction with 
armed polities—namely criminal syndicates, warlord organizations and insurgent 
movements. The final section of this study examines the role each armed polity has 
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played in the production of narcotics in Afghanistan over the course of 30 years of 
conflict. Each polity is examined and presented individually, and draws upon the 
conclusions reached from the historical analysis completed earlier in this study.  
A. INSURGENT MOVEMENTS—THE TALIBAN 
The Taliban nurtured the narcotics industry between 2002 and 2006 because of 
strategic operational concerns. First, the Taliban sought to regain economic capabilities 
by any means necessary; criminal enterprise, including protecting the drug trade and 
kidnapping for ransom, which became a viable and acceptable option for short-term 
income. Second, the political capital gained in southern Afghanistan by extending a 
“helping hand” to farmers perceived to be oppressed by an aggressive and belligerent 
interim government became a key pillar in the Taliban’s strategy to penetrate the rural 
countryside in search of safe havens and public support.  
 
Insurgent 
Movements 1980–1994 1994–2001 2001–2010 
Engagement Type Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 2 
Benefits Monetary gain, 
access to 
smuggling routes, 




bartered drugs for 
weapons and 
ammunition, access 
to smuggling routes, 
political capital, 






access to smuggling 
routes. 
Change - + - 
Table 8.   Insurgent Movements 
Such public support would allow the Taliban a large degree of operational 
freedom, including an enhanced intelligence and support network throughout the rural 
environs, a level of mutual trust between narco-criminal groups and the insurgents, and 
the establishment of sanctuaries located inside of Afghanistan, mostly in the poppy-
producing southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Uruzgan, Nimroz and 
Zabul. The Taliban remains committed to participating in the drug industry for economic 
benefit and political legitimacy, but uneven involvement leaves it at a tier-two level of 
 91
participation. The most dangerous byproduct from its interaction with the narcotics 
industry is its outsourcing of technical skills (i.e., IED-cells, suicide-bombers) to criminal 
consortia, and some warlord organizations, for sophisticated attacks against security, law 
enforcement, and political and business rivals.  
Since 2006, insurgents like the Taliban—allied with narcotics-linked criminal 
entrepreneurs and armed farmers—have increasingly targeted counternarcotics and 
Poppy Eradication Forces (PEF), a combined force nearly 4,000 strong, since 2007.230 In 
2008, the UN tallied 78 fatalities caused by mine explosions, gun attacks, and suicide 
bombings against eradication teams and counternarcotics personnel, an increase of about 
75% if compared to the 19 deaths in 2007.231 The trend of criminals supporting or 
facilitating attacks against eradication personnel and government targets by outsourcing 
tactical operations to insurgent factions, such as the Taliban, has continued in 2009 and 
2010. By mid-April 2009, three narco-suicide attacks (plus one unsuccessful) targeting 
counternarcotics headquarters and staff throughout southwestern Afghanistan left 16 
people dead and 55 wounded.232 By the end of 2009, the UNODC estimated 21 Afghan 
policemen were killed during attacks against counternarcotics and poppy eradication 
teams, although this number seems to underestimate the actual number of fatalities and 
casualties.233 The 2010 anti-poppy campaign also witnessed a series of violent clashes 
between insurgents and eradicators. In fact, the anti-poppy campaign in Helmand, 
Nimroz and Kandahar provinces, the most unstable and violent provinces in southern 
Afghanistan, was postponed shortly after it began due to the high levels of resistance. 
Kandahar and Helmand are responsible for producing most of Afghanistan’s opium.  
The close proximity of these areas to smuggling avenues into Pakistan and Iran 
makes these provinces more valuable to trafficking groups and international traders; 
hence, the violent reaction by such groups when government led initiatives are launched. 
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Only four days after the 2010 anti-poppy drive began in Helmand, five counter narcotics 
policemen were killed after Taliban gunmen ambushed them while eradicating crops in 
the Girishk district, and two others were injured.234 Despite the high level of insecurity, 
preliminary government-led initiatives began in Farah province. Poppy eradicators, 
backed up by soldiers from the Afghan National Army, began operations in Farah 
province on February 22 and destroyed only 30 acres of poppy in the Pasht-Rud district. 
However, the major threat of improvised-explosive-devices (IEDs) and even suicide-
bombers remain a key security challenge to the Governor-Led-Eradication initiatives.  
Although the term “narco-suicide terrorism” has not caught on among U.S. 
policymakers, the mechanisms for its emergence have been in place since the Taliban 
was overthrown in late 2001. In an ominous sign of narco-related violence in 
Afghanistan, rival drug syndicate members gunned down the newly minted Vice-
President of Afghanistan, Haji Abdul Qadir, as he visited Kabul on July 6, 2002. His 
murder has been attributed to the criminal syndicate led by Haji Mohammad Zaman, a 
rogue paramilitary commander and tribal rival from Nangarhar—who along with Hazrat 
Ali and Haji Qadir—once constituted the anti-Taliban bloc known as the “Eastern 
Shura.”235 The Eastern Shura helped small teams of U.S. special forces hunt down al 
Qaeda fighters and Osama Bin Landen in the Tora Bora mountains, located on the 
Nangarhar-Pakistan border frontier, in December 2001. Zaman was accused of betraying 
U.S. forces and helped facilitate the escape of hundreds of al Qaeda fighters, including 
top commanders Ayman al Zawarhiri and Osama bin Laden. Following the accusations 
of colluding with al Qaeda, the murder of Abdul Qadir, and the failed plot to assassinate 
Afghanistan’s new Minster of Defense in 2002, Zaman fled to Pakistan until President 
Karzai assured him amnesty if he returned to Afghanistan in 2010. Following his much-
anticipated return from exile, a suicide bomber killed Zaman along with 15 others on 
February 22, 2010 as he and his entourage returned to Nangarhar province from 
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Pakistan.236 Although Zaman’s death was initially attributed to the Taliban given the 
method (suicide-bomber) used to kill him, details soon emerged indicating Zaman had 
been targeted and killed by “purchased” suicide-attackers, or more aptly described, 
narco-suicide bombers. High paying and powerful personalities, such as the Arsalayee 
clan to which Haji Abdul Qadir belonged, can facilitate suicide attacks through insurgent 
intermediaries by offering political protection and financial assistance. The Taliban or 
insurgent affiliated intermediary in turn provides a willing and equipped suicide-attacker 
who is likely unaware that his intended target is the victim of a vendetta. Several other 
narco-suicide attacks have been documented in Afghanistan since 2008, an alarming 
trend that has not been publicly recognized by international forces in Afghanistan.237 
Although the Taliban has proven itself to participate in the narcotics industry in 
varying capacities, the organization has yet to transform itself into a defacto drug 
enterprise or cartel where actors are vertically integrated and control the cultivation, 
processing, trading and transnational trafficking and distribution of narcotics on a wide-
scale. Second, the Taliban does not solely depend upon drug profits to maintain its 
organization; rather, drug profits are used to benefit and maintain some local and 
provincial level Taliban groups, mostly those located in Helmand and parts of the 
traditional southern poppy-belt. The Taliban’s main objectives appear to be political and 
ideological in nature despite making a substantial profit from the narcotics industry and 
gaining political capital from siding with rural farmers who grow poppy and process 
opium. However, the structure of the Taliban is evolving and the Taliban’s organizational 
construct is partially able to explain both the Taliban’s involvement in the narcotics 
industry and its inability to consolidate itself into a dominant drug enterprise. Some 
Taliban fronts remain committed to serious participation in the narcotics trade to fund 
their activities, mostly in Helmand province and parts of Kandahar and Farah.  
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Overall, opium production has caused “the rise of a ‘shadow state,’ where the 
distinction between using official position for the public good and private gain merges,” a 
description that easily describes the current situation and the Taliban-era regime as 
well.238 Much like the insurgency and the role of its actors in the drug industry, the 
government’s own involvement is simply a resource that has been opportunistically used. 
The intrinsic relationship between criminals and insurgents has seriously eroded Afghan 
state authority, successfully defeated law enforcement efforts to curb drug production, 
and continues to pose a serious threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan. 
B. STATE-POWER BROKERS—NARCOSTATIZATION 
As noted in the previous section, an alarmingly dangerous manifestation of the 
narcotics industry in Afghanistan is the ongoing “narcostatization” of the Afghan state, 
the rapid penetration of formal intuitions by narco-trafficking groups and personalities, a 
trend that is steadily hollowing out the state and may have already eclipsed the danger 
posed by the drug-insurgent nexus.239 As Arias aptly notes: 
The variety of roles that armed actors can play in governance often emerge 
as a result of relationships between armed actors and wider institutional, 
social and economic factors. Illegal groups operate in specific ways on the 
paths of economic flows, within markets, and in relation to other elements 
of state and society…even guerilla armies rely on semi-clandestine 
networks, contacts in the government, and other illegal actors to support 
their activities.240 
Just as insurgent groups may rely upon contacts within the government or other 
illegal entities, the role of the state power broker in a developing system, particularly one 
whose writ is weak and territorial jurisdiction is compromised or incomplete, relies upon 
connections within insurgent and criminal groups to facilitate their own level of criminal 
participation and profiteering. The latter is not restricted to the narcotics industry, but 
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may encompass the smuggling of both licit and illicit goods, illegal tax schemes, political 
protection to traffickers, the selling of state-owned goods, such as weapons and 
ammunition, or even “soft” commodities like fuel and food. Afghanistan is not dissimilar 
to other fragile states in transition or states like Burma where civil war and narcotics 
production have dominated the socio-economic spectrum over the past four decades. The 
occurrence of criminal opportunism in a fragmenting society amidst a growing civil war 
is nearly inevitable, especially given the highly criminalized status of the local 
economies.  
The prominent drug trafficking expert Lamond Tullis came to a similar 
conclusion, indicating the power of organized drug trafficking networks lies in their 
ability to infiltrate or establish mutually beneficial relationships among all actors in the 
illicit drug industry. Trafficking groups successfully achieve this by a) infiltrating 
bureaucracies, b) buying decisions (e.g., corrupting law enforcement agents and the 
judiciary), c) making alliances with ideologues (e.g., warlord organizations, militias, 
insurgent groups,), d) launching intimidation campaigns and violent attacks, and e) 
creating an anti-state wholly outside the rule of law.241 A critical component of the 
analysis put forth by Tullis is the traffickers’ ability to penetrate bureaucracies, or in 
other words, the emergence of a crime-state nexus.  
Many Afghans now believe the current government is more actively involved in 
the narcotics trade than criminals or the Taliban, according to extensive fieldwork by 
leading narcotics expert David Mansfield.242 Afghanistan’s former Attorney General, 
Abdul Jabbar Sabit, held a similar position when he told senior U.S. counter-narcotics 
officials in 2008 that he had investigated more than 20 senior Afghan officials who were 
engaged in major criminal activities; many of them were linked to the narcotics trade.243 
Two pertinent examples of suspected state penetration by the drug trade include Gen. 
Daud Daud, the recently demoted deputy Interior Minister for Counternarcotics, who 
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authorities caught issuing “protection” letters to drug traffickers in 2007 and the Afghan 
President’s half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai who has been routinely accused in the media 
and by Western officials of facilitating drug shipments in southern Afghanistan.244 
Importantly, many of the unsavory warlords of the mujahideen era and the civil war 
period who were deeply involved in the narcotics industry became leading figures in the 
Afghan Interim Administration, some of whom survived politically post-Parliamentary 
elections in 2004 to become state representatives.  
 
Index of Narcostatization Indicators245 
Level 1 Incipient 
• Bribery of low-level officials 
• Widespread consumption and inability to either through 
lack of capability or will to reduce demand. 
• Increasing cultural support for drug consumption. 
Level 2 Developing 
• Increasing governmental support for drug consumption 
• Antidrug activities removed from educational and cultural 
institutions 
Level 3 Serious 
• Massive bribery and corruption of public officials 
• Substantial intimidation, including murder, of resisting 
officials 
Level 4 Critical 
• Corruption at the highest levels of national police and 
judicial systems, endemic extortion rather than bribery 
• Top-level police enter drug trade, protect it, and authorize 
political assassinations 
• Financing of journalists and magazines by drug lords; 
narco-journalists become known and remain in place 
Level 5 Advanced 
• Compliance of ministries, in addition to judiciary and 
police, with organized crime 
• A president surrounded by compromised officials 
• Possible complicity of the presidency itself, e.g., the 
president may be charged as capo di tutti capi and public 
not be surprised. 
Table 9.   Index of Narcostatization Indicators 
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David C. Jordan conceived one of the best descriptions of narcostatization 
sequencing and is represented in Table 9. As it currently stands, Afghanistan fits in 
between level three and four, or what Jordan describes as “critical,” where extensive 
bribery and corruption of public officials occurs, substantial intimidation, including 
murder, of resisting officials happens, and senior police commanders are known to enter 
the drug trade, protect it, and authorize political assassinations. It is hard to argue that 
Afghanistan does not indeed consist of some elements from level five, the “advanced” 
stage of nacostatization, including a president surrounded by compromised officials and 
the compliance of certain ministries, police and intelligence apparatuses with organized 
crime.  
The United States and NATO are increasingly focusing on the transition of 
security responsibilities to the Afghan government and its burgeoning security apparatus 
in preparation for a scale-down of forces beginning in July 2011. This reliance neglects 
the complexities of the crime-state nexus that has occurred over the past nine years, and 
as seen in Mexico and Jamaica, the drug industry flourishes in a place like Afghanistan 
“because all too often the very people charged with fighting the drug trade are corrupted 
by drugs money.”246 The progression of the state from a tier two participant to a tier three 
participant during the contemporary conflict period is not overly surprising, but offers a 
complex problem-set for western policy makers.  
State Institutions 1980–1994 1994–2001 2001–2010 
Engagement Type N/A Tier 2 Tier 2–3 












attempt at market 
domination. 
Change - + + 
Table 10.   State Institutions 
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C. CRIMINAL CONSORTIA—THE CRIMINAL-INSURGENCY IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
One of the most difficult elements of the contemporary conflict in Afghanistan is 
properly contextualizing what organized crime enterprises are operating in the country 
and how to differentiate them from either state institutions (or state-power brokers) or 
elements of the insurgency. The amount of overlap is considerable, and the nuisances of 
criminal consortia are largely pushed to the sidelines.  
However, some analyses have managed to describe the complexities of criminal 
consortia and how they fit into the larger political economy of the Afghan drug industry. 
In the remote and isolated plains of northwestern Afghanistan, an organized crime 
syndicate known as the “Murghabi mafia” (suitably named after Murgahab, the district 
from which it originated) evolved out of prior criminal elements that succeeded in 
penetrating the provincial government apparatus of Badghis and forged links with hostile 
non-state entities, such as trafficking groups from southern Afghanistan (Kandahar and 
Helmand), and possibly with Taliban insurgents.247 The main motivator for criminal 
syndicates participating in the drug industry remains gross economic profits, opportunity 
and self-interests, such as prestige and social value—with territorial influence and 
freedom of movement ranking a close second.248 This conclusion directly challenges the 
conventional wisdom that criminal organizations are only concerned with self-
preservation and profit. Overarching political objectives, or ideology are typically absent 
from the criminal syndicates’ strategic consideration, although local or smaller territorial 
aspirations are a driving motivation for criminal kingpins to instigate, control and 
monopolize certain types of instability for its own purposes. Such small-scale territorial 
ambitions are much different from insurgent movements that seek to consolidate and 
control vast swathes of territory and political institutions, if not an entire state, and those 
of warlord organizations, that seek to control large blocs of territory usually delineated 
along larger ethnic, religious or tribal lines.  
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By and large, the criminal consortium operating in Afghanistan largely remains 
part of the brokerage system and remain domestically focused, although at times, such 
groups comprised international drug distribution capabilities, such as the networks of 
Haji Juma Khan, Baaz Mohammad, Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Bagcho. Of course, 
there are outliers, such as the Arsaylee clan from Nangarhar Province that sought larger 
political objectives, mostly driven from its historical status as political and business 
elites. The clan’s interest in political appointments and territorial consolidation certainly 
straddles the fine line between criminal consortia and a warlord organization. In sum, it is 
the criminal consortium that bridges the gap between insurgent movements, political 
power brokers, and society at large, with the informal and illicit industry of narcotics 
production—from cultivation, to processing and trafficking. Criminal organizations 
remain the entities from which all armed polities seek cooperation and assistance, which 
is evidenced by the degree of continuity between the violence associated with the trade 
and those of the state, insurgency, and warlord organizations.  
 
Criminal Consortium 1980–1994 1994–2001 2001–2010 
Engagement Type Tier 2 Tier 2–3 Tier 3 
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Table 11.   Criminal Consortium 
D. WARLORD ORGANIZATIONS—NARCO-STRONGMEN AND 
POLITICAL ENTERPRISE  
The role of warlord organizations in the Afghan drug industry remains resilient 
from its inception nearly 30 years ago. The major impact of warlord organizations in the 
current situation is their integration into the Afghan central government and 
Afghanistan’s private business sector, many of whom supported overtures offered by the 
leadership of President Hamid Karzai in exchange for patronage and loyalty to the new 
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administration. For instance, when President Karzai chose the former defense minister, 
Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim, as his running mate in the 2009 presidential 
elections, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reportedly told Mr. Karzai that 
“running with Marshal Fahim would damage his standing with the United States and 
other countries” given Fahim’s strong ties to the narcotics industry.249 
The evolution of warlord organizations in Afghanistan during the 1980s is a 
reflection of the militarization of Afghan society and the resources available to those with 
positions of leadership within the resistance. What separates these entities from insurgent 
movements is the preoccupation with illicit market activities, narcotics production and 
trafficking, as well as controlling illicit trade routes. Additionally, by marginalizing 
government influence in their particular territories by performing some tasks of the 
government and providing some types of social services (i.e., security, justice), these 
organizations help transform these areas into quasi-states within a state and govern as 
they wish.250 Warlords and their subordinate strongmen created strong patron-client 
relationships that led to the extended duration of the civil war period following the state’s 
collapse in 1992. Like most post-conflict state building scenarios, Afghanistan’s former 
warlords follow a learning curve into the transition to businessmen and statesmen, often 
fusing their notoriety for violence with monopolistic capitalism and cronyism.  
The privatization of security in Afghanistan is an excellent example of former 
warlords utilizing some of their best assets, power, weapons and loyalty, into a profit 
making business that spans the divide between government and public service. Many of 
the groups operate in the insecure and unstable poppy cultivation and drug trafficking 
territories of southern and southwestern Afghanistan where their ties to drug traffickers, 
the state, and the insurgency remain blurred.  
The security environment of Afghanistan post-2001, and the demand from U.S. 
forces to empower local surrogates and state allies, has led to the emergence of nouveau 
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warlords―mostly young, achieved status individuals who rose to prominence for their 
ability to deliver goods or services in a post-Taliban era.251 Highway security and convoy 
protection is one area in which these strongmen excel, but invariably, these commanders 
and their militias compete with the central government for power and authority. Under 
the guise of private security companies, these commanders exploit the current security 
vacuum and reap huge profits for their services, often outsourcing their expertise to both 
licit and illicit entities.  
According to a U.S. Congressional report: 
A warlord’s power is principally derived from his ability to control 
security within a defined territory. The business of warlordism is to seek 
rents from those who would occupy that space, whether the local 
population or trucks attempting to transit through it. Given the extremely 
limited road network in Afghanistan, highways are prime real estate. If a 
highway also happens to be a critical component of the U.S. supply chain 
for the distribution of goods in Afghanistan, the opportunity for rent-
seeking is massive. Of course, the business model depends on the 
warlord’s ability to monopolize control of the highway and to fight off 
competition.252 
Warlords control substantial portions of Afghanistan’s southern highway system, 
and with it, extract considerable amounts of informal taxes for those who use them, 
including from all strata’s of society, not just from the peasant base like insurgents. Those 
who fall victim to the warlord organizations’ rent extraction include local residents, the 
U.S. military and NATO forces, the Afghan government, and illicit entrepreneurs, such 
as smugglers and drug traffickers. One such example is Abdul Wali “Koka” Khan, a 
notorious local strongman from the Musa Qala district of Helmand province, a legacy 
region in regards to Afghanistan’s torrid history with narcotics production. In 2002, 
American forces imprisoned Koka at Bagram jail in 2002 for suspected involvement in 
insurgent activities. After 14 months of prison, he returned to Helmand and by 2006, he 
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reemerged as a militia commander for the Afghan government in Musa Qala, although 
his tenure was marked by allegations of wide scale killings and robberies. According to 
the former district governor of Musa Qala, Koka took $20,000 a day in opium taxes and 
was involved in many mass murders.253 His militia of 220 men was strong and capable 
enough to launch “anti-Taliban military operations” as far away as Lashkargah, nearly 
110-kilometers south of Musa Qala. Despite his unsavory reputation and connections to 
the narcotics trade, political pressure from senior Afghan officials prompted the British to 
drop their diplomatic grievances against Koka. Karzai reinstalled Koka as police chief in 
2008 where he still serves today, fighting alongside U.S. Marine forces stationed in Musa 
Qala.  
The anecdote of Abdul Wali “Koka” Khan only scratches the surface of the wide 
ranging complexities of the role warlords, strongmen, and their militias play in the 
myriad of factors regarding the structure and workings of the Afghan drug trade. Scores 
of unsavory strongmen and their militias, both old guard legacy warlords and younger 
achieved status warlords, continue to operate alongside NATO forces and the Afghan 
government. Opium fueled politics alliances have proven to shorten the life-cycle of 
many political alliances in Afghanistan, and now that the drug problem continues to grow 
in importance, warlords involved in the drug industry could be less likely to cooperate 
with the Afghan state and NATO forces in the near future.254 The political connectivity 
and military capabilities of warlord organizations, which control larger swathes of 
territory compared to criminal consortium through their complex patron-client networks 
and overarching monopoly of violence, represent one of the greatest metastasizing threats 
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Table 12.   Warlord Organizations 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Increasingly, state failure is becoming a characteristic of the Afghan war, and as 
Newberg suggests, war is failing the Afghan state, which will invariably lead to more 
war.255 The penetration of the narcotics industry in Afghanistan’s state apparatus is 
equally, or not more so, a threat to Afghanistan’s sovereignty, stability and security than 
the perceived threat of the drug-insurgent nexus. Through social networks and past 
blending of warlord organizations, insurgent movements, and criminal consortium with 
the state power structure, Afghanistan has essentially evolved into a narco-state as 
defined by David C. Jordan. Although analysts might assume that insurgent or 
revolutionary movements should be somewhat inclined to participate in illicit activities to 
help boost their respective war chests, the emerging phenomenon of narco-suicide 
bombing is the most alarming byproduct of the drug-insurgent dynamic found in 
Afghanistan.  
As William Reno appropriately states, “the collapse of institutions that can control 
and discipline armed individuals leaves all groups vulnerable to attacks from 
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competitors.”256 How then, does the participation in illicit industries, such as the drug 
trade affect Islamic nationalist insurgent movements like the Taliban, especially in 
regards to group cohesion and political objectives? First, the political re-fragmentation of 
Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the subsequent 
reemergence of many former warlords and nefarious political entrepreneurs unleashed a 
self-reinforcing cycle of violence, institutional dysfunction and competition to control 
illicit networks and industry assets. In short, these dynamics established a “new 
retrograde set of social relationships…in which economics and violence are deeply 
intertwined within the shared framework of identity politics.”257 Competition among 
actors in the illicit industries sector promotes the skills of war fighters and commanders, 
who in light of their own self-interests and violent tendencies, creates an environment of 
fear and trepidation that forces many ordinary citizens and local leaders to flee or seek 
protection from such predatory armed polities.  
A major challenge to state building in Afghanistan in a contemporary sense is the 
political space in which all four armed polities engage in the narcotics industry. As this 
study has shown, social and historical factors, especially the trends and patterns which 
emerged during the past 30 years of conflict, has endeared many militarized and 
predatory political entrepreneurs to gain access to state resources and maintain vital 
political connections despite variations in the type of political system in place. This has 
led to uneven political development, leaving many of Afghanistan’s 398 districts under 
various types of proto-control from groups like the Taliban and their “shadow 
administrations” to semi-autonomous regions under the jurisdiction of former warlords 
loosely connected with the central government.  
In sum, this study shows how four armed polities engage in the Afghan narcotics 
industry and how they vary in their level of participation and influence in the industry. 
One strong correlation among all groups is how, over the studied period of time, each 
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armed polity has become increasingly bound to the state structure, mostly through the 
transaction-brokerage nature of the drug trade and the traditional societal networks that 
bind them together with khans, maliks, commanders, religious leaders, and government 
representatives. This metamorphosis evolved over time; however, this synthesis is not 
necessarily the precursor to a joint-cooperative per se, but it does represent a well-defined 
“system of war” where all actors participate in various levels of the narcotics industry for 
clearly articulated reasons; namely profit, enhancing military capabilities, political 
capital, social value (prestige) and legitimacy, territorial gains, and power. It is inaccurate 
to assume the Taliban or one of the other identified armed polities dominate the 
production of narcotics production and the trafficking of these commodities at any 
particular time; thus, no cartel system has yet emerged. However, it is important to 
recognize that while all types of armed polities examined in this study are involved in the 
production and trafficking of heroin at some level, the Taliban is integrated in the entire 
process—accepting the cultivation of narcotics, taxing its production, protecting 
processing and trafficking routes for money, aiding in the trafficking of narcotics 
internally, bartering refined narcotics for weapons and explosives, and maintaining 
relationships with transnational organized crime groups responsible for operating 
international distribution operations. Economic flows and the levels of violence 
associated with the narcotics industry in Afghanistan varies significantly by region, and 
although some reports suggest the drug industry is being consolidated or dominated by a 
particular entity, likely state-power brokers associated with warlord organizations, 
Afghanistan’s narco-trade is still characterized by transaction networks.258 In regards to 
the Taliban’s participation in this complex transaction-brokerage system, President 
Karzai’s half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, explains the fluidity and unpredictably of this 
territorial-based brokerage system: 
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The Taliban is not one [group] any longer. There are different tribes and 
groups. One person does not control a 400-kilometer road. Maybe there is 
one leadership in Pakistan, but when you come down here [Kandahar 
Province], there are different tribes, different groups, different people…a 
guy in Helmand bought 30 dump trucks and paid one Taliban commander 
to get them through, but soon another [Taliban commander] heard of this 
and came and burnt all the trucks.259 
In sum, the largely fragmented and decentralized components of the Taliban are 
unevenly engaged in the narcotics industry, but are most integrated with the industry in 
the unstable southern provinces where the U.N. estimates over 90% of Afghanistan’s 
opium poppy is cultivated.  
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APPENDIX A. CHRONOLOGY OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND 
THE LAWS AND PROHIBITIONS REGARDING NARCOTICS 
UNDER THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN (1994–2001) 
1994-The Taliban movement originates in Kandahar’s Maiwand district, a 
strategic agrarian community that has cultivated poppies for well over a hundred years by 
its Pashtun inhabitants. The Taliban releases a small pamphlet telling Kandahar’s 
residents what the Taliban considered legal and illegal. “The cultivation and usage of 
charis (hashish) is forbidden absolutely,” it read.260 “The consumption of opiates is 
forbidden, as is the manufacture of heroin, but the production and trading of opium is not 
forbidden.”261 
November 11, 1996-the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, Mullah Mohammad Ghaus, 
sends a formal note to the UNDCP indicating the Taliban agreed to take the “necessary 
measures” to suppress the production, processing, and trafficking of narcotics in 
Afghanistan. Ghaus stressed the need for regional and international cooperation but 
stressed the “principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.”262 
December 17, 1996-The al-Amir bi al-Ma’ruf wa al-Nahi ‘an al-Munkir (the 
Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppression of Vice, the Religious police’ of the 
Taliban) released a legal decree written by Mullah Mohammad on December 17, 1996 in 
Kabul. The document banned sixteen activities deemed “un-Islamic” by Omar, including 
the sixth commandment: “drug trafficking is forbidden as is the usage of drugs.”263 The 
following except comes from a sourced copy of the document that was translated from 
Dari to English and handed over to western agencies in 1996. No. 8 reads, “To eradicate  
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the use of addiction. Addicts should be imprisoned and investigation made to find the 
supplier and shop. The shop should be locked and the owner and [sic] user be imprisoned 
and punished.”264 
September 10, 1997-The State High Commission for Drug Control, the Taliban’s 
counternarcotics office, stated that: “The Islamic State of Afghanistan informs all 
compatriots that as the use of heroin and hashish are not permitted in Islam; they are 
reminded once again that they should strictly refrain from growing, using, and trading 
hashish and heroin. Anyone who violates this order shall be meted out a punishment in 
line with the lofty Mohammad and Shari’ah Law and this shall not be entitled to launch a 
complaint.”265 
October 1997-The State High Commission for Drug Control amends the 
September 10th decree adding an additional clause banning the cultivation and trafficking 
of opium.266 
July 2, 1998-the Pakistani Prime Minister approves $6.5 million dollars to be 
given to the Taliban government despite facing harsh economic sanctions following its 
nuclear detonation in May.  
March 1999-UNDCP, Pakistani law enforcement officials and Taliban officials 
meet in Islamabad Pakistan. Additional meetings follow in which UNDCP pledge aid to 
help locate largest poppy opium fields.267  
April 1999-Mullah Omar reissues a ban on hashish cultivation.268 
July 6, 1999-President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 13129 imposing a ban 
on economic transactions between the Taliban and the American government. 
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September 1999-The Taliban issued a decree ordering all Afghan poppy farmers 
to decrease their poppy acreage by one third.269 There is little evidence this was 
effectively enforced. 
November 28, 1999-“We are against poppy cultivation, narcotics production and 
drugs, but we cannot fight our own people. They are the sole source of our authority,” 
Abdul Hakeem Mujahed, the Taliban representative in the United States, told 
reporters.270  
February 1999-The Taliban faced a severe shortfall in funding from external 
sources, namely payments from the Pakistani government. Small arms ammunition, 
rockets, wireless radio batteries and payments for fighters begin to dry up. Frontline 
Taliban commanders on the northern-front begin to defect to Jamiat-Islami and Ahmad 
Shah Massoud’s forces in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces.  
July 27, 2000-Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund announced the prohibition of 
poppy cultivation, calling it “un-Islamic.”271 This is the first decree by the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan that used religious framing to prohibit the cultivation of poppy. 
The ban is initially announced nationally on Radio Shari’ah and followed up at the 
district level by local mullahs and district administrators and by the Drug Control and 
Coordination units. The ban, given this much attention by the Taliban government, is 
widely received by the Afghan population. By August 2001, the UNODC reported the 
cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan had decreased from 82,000 ha to 8,000 ha between 
2000 and 2001, the largest decrease in a nation’s output of narcotics in a single year.272  
September–October 2000-Local shuras disseminate the decree prohibiting poppy 
cultivation and manage the program at the district and village level.  
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May 2001-the US State Department announces a $43 million grant to help support 
the counter-narcotics policy implemented by the Taliban in Afghanistan.273  
September 2, 2001-The Taliban Voice of Shari’ah radio program allegedly 
announces the Taliban’s end to the prohibition of poppy cultivation.274  
September 25, 2001-The Taliban tells Afghan farmers that they would be free to 
resume planting poppy if the American military launched an attack against Afghanistan.  
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APPENDIX B. TIER 2 AND TIER 3 AFGHAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS 
Image Name Description Charge 
 
Haji Bashir Noorzai Haji Bashir Noorzai 
comes from a prevalent 
landed elite family from 
western Kandahar. He 
owned large tracks of 
fertile farmland where he 
and his loyalists produced 
most of Kandahar’s 
opium throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s. 
He is said to have a 
personal relationship with 
senior Taliban officials, 
such as Mullah Omar, but 
is also related to powerful 
government officials, 
such as Aref Khan 
Noorzai (his cousin). He 
provided the Taliban with 
money and pickup trucks 
during its ascent to power 
in 1994.  
Haji Bashir Noorzai was 
arrested in April 2005 
after a sophisticated 
sting operation lured him 
to New York City. 
Facing Federal drug 
trafficking charges, the 
jury found Bashir guilty 
of importing more than 
$50 million in heroin 
from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to the United 
States and other 
countries. A judge in 
New York sentenced 
Bashir to life in prison in 
May 2009 after a jury 
convicted him in an 
international narcotics 
trafficking conspiracy in 
2008.  
 
Haji Juma Khan Since 1999, Khan led an 
international opium, 
morphine and heroin 
trafficking group that 
arranged to sell morphine 
base, an opium derivative 
that is processed into 
heroin, in quantities as 
large as 40 metric tons. 
He ran an international 
shipping firm from Sharja 
and Dubai where he 
laundered money and 
trafficked in large-scale 
shipments of heroin. He 
is suspected of 
maintaining close ties to 
both al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  
The United States 
charged Haji Juma Khan 
with narco-terrorism, 
conspiracy to fund and 
financing terrorism in a 
superseding indictment 
unsealed by the U.S. 
Attorney's Office in 
Manhattan in April 
2009. Khan was arrested 
during a U.S. sting 
operation as he landed at 
an airport in Indonesia in 
October 2008. U.S. 
authorities say he is 
among the first 
defendants to be 








Haji Baaz Mohammad 
led a drug trafficking 
organization in eastern 
Afghanistan that 
maintained close links to 
the Taliban and provided 
financial support to the 
Taliban derived from 
drug profits. Between 
1994 and 2000, the 
organization collected 
heroin proceeds in the 
United States, which 
were used to pay the 
Taliban to provide 
protection for its opium 
crops, heroin-processing 
facilities, drug-trafficking 
routes, and to Baaz and 
his inner circle.275 Baaz 
Mohammad is 
Afghanistan’s first heroin 
kingpin ever to be 
extradited to the United 
States from Afghanistan 
for narcotics charges.  
President Karzai 
authorized the 
extradition of Baaz 
Mohammad to the 
United States in October 
2005. On July 11, 2006, 
Baaz Mohammad 
pleaded guilty in 
Manhattan federal 
court. He was sentenced 
in October 2007 to 16 




that imported millions of 
dollars of heroin into the 
United States, according 
to the U.S. Attorney’s 




Haji Bagcho, a.k.a 
Haji Bagh Chagul 
Haji Bagcho is one of 
Afghanistan’s most 
notorious high-profile 
drug traffickers. He led 
his organization in 
eastern Afghanistan 
(Nangarhar) where he 
maintained an armed 
militia group to protect 
his interests and attack 
government assets 
seeking to disrupt his 
criminal enterprise. He 
was arrested in the 
summer of 2009 by U.S. 
and Afghan law 
enforcement personnel. 
Bagcho was extradited to 
the United States on 
June 29, 2010. The 
United States charged 
Bagcho in a two-count 
indictment with one 
count of conspiracy to 
distribute one kilogram 
or more of heroin and 
another heroin 
distribution charge. If 
convicted on either of 
these charges, Bagcho 
faces a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 
years in prison and a 
maximum of life in 
prison. 
                                                 
275 Material sourced from Jim Kouri, “Afghan Drug Kingpin Baz Mohammad Extradited to New 
York,” CPP, October 17, 2007.  
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